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Abstract
We evaluate the asymptotics of equivocations, their exponents as well as their second-order coding rates under
various Re´nyi information measures. Specifically, we consider the effect of applying a hash function on a source and
we quantify the level of non-uniformity and dependence of the compressed source from another correlated source
when the number of copies of the sources is large. Unlike previous works that use Shannon information measures
to quantify randomness, information or uniformity, we define our security measures in terms of a more general
class of information measures—the Re´nyi information measures and their Gallager-type counterparts. A special
case of these Re´nyi information measure is the class of Shannon information measures. We prove tight asymptotic
results for the security measures and their exponential rates of decay. We also prove bounds on the second-order
asymptotics and show that these bounds match when the magnitudes of the second-order coding rates are large. We
do so by establishing new classes non-asymptotic bounds on the equivocation and evaluating these bounds using
various probabilistic limit theorems asymptotically.
Index Terms
Information-theoretic security, Equivocation, Conditional Re´nyi entropies, Re´nyi divergence, Sibson’s mutual
information, Arimoto’s mutual information, Error exponents, Secrecy Exponents, Second-order coding rates
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the situation where we are given n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) copies of a joint
source (An, En). One of the central tasks in information-theoretic security is to understand the effect of applying
a hash function [1] (binning operator) f on An. This hash function is used to ensure that the compressed source
f(An) is almost uniform on its alphabet and also almost independent of another discrete memoryless source En.
Mathematically, we want to understand the deviation of f(An) ∈ {1, . . . , denRe} from the uniform distribution on
the same support Pmix,f(An) and the level of remaining dependence between f(An) and a correlated source En.
These two criteria can be described by equivocation measures. Traditionally in information-theoretic security [2],
[3], equivocation is measured in terms of the Shannon-type quantities such as the Shannon entropy, relative entropy
(Kullback-Leibler divergence), and mutual information. In particular, it is common to design f such that the
following is small for any rate R:
D(Pf(An),En‖Pmix,f(An) × PEn) = nR−H(f(An)|En). (1)
Clearly if the above quantity is small in some sense, the message f(An) is close to uniform and almost independent
of En, two desirable traits of a hash function for security applications.
A. Motivations
A novel feature of this paper is that we depart from using Shannon information measures to quantify randomness
and independence. It is known that the Shannon entropy H or the relative entropy D are special cases of a larger
family of information measures known as Re´nyi information measures, denoted as H1+s and D1+s for s ∈ R.
Thus, as expounded by Iwamoto and Shikata [4], we can quantify equivocation using these measures, gaining
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2deeper insights into the fundamental limits of information leakage under the effect of hash functions. There may
also be a possibility of the optimal key generation rate changing when we use alternative information measures. In
addition, in the study of cryptography and quantum key distribution (QKD), the Re´nyi entropy of order 2 [5] (or
collision entropy) H2(A|PA) := − log
∑
a∈A PA(a)
2 and the min-entropy Hmin(A|PA) := − log maxa∈A PA(a)
play important roles in quantifying randomness. A case in point is the leftover hash lemma [6]–[8]. Another
motivation stems from the recent study of overcoming weak expectations by Dodis and Yu [9] where cryptographic
primitives are based on weak secrets, in which the only information about the secret is some fraction of min-entropy.
The authors in [9] provided bounds on the weak expectation Ef(Y ) of some function f of a random variable Y in
terms of the min-entropy and the Re´nyi entropy of order 2. In a follow-on paper by Yao and Li [10], this study was
generalized to Re´nyi entropies of general orders. Finally, in the study of secure authentication codes (or A-codes
in short), which is one of the most fundamental cryptographic protocols in information-theoretic cryptography,
Shikata [11] quantified lengths of secret keys in terms of Re´nyi entropies of general orders. Motivated by these
studies, the authors opine that it is of interest to study the performance of hashing under these generalized families
of entropies (generalized uncertainty measures) and divergences (generalized distance measures).
B. Main Contributions
We consider three asymptotic settings—the asymptotics of Re´nyi-type security measures, its exponential decay
and a certain second-order behavior.
1) First, we characterize the asymptotic behavior of the security measure
D1+s(Pf(An),En‖Pmix,f(An) × PEn) (2)
for a fixed rate R = 1n log ‖f‖ where ‖f‖ := |f(An)| is the cardinality of the range of a hash function f .
The function f will be taken to be a random hash function as we will explain and motivate later. Further,
as we shall see in Section II-B, the quantity in (2) is closely related to the equivocation [12]. In Section III
(particularly in Corollary 1 therein), we show that if we measure security using D1+s with s > 0, the
fundamental limits of key generation rates change relative to those for traditional Shannon-type measures
D1. The security measure in (2) quantifies the deviation of the hashed or compressed random variable f(An)
from the uniform distribution and also its remaining dependence from a correlated random variable En.
2) We are also interested in the speed of the exponential decay of (2) given a fixed rate R. That is, we are
interested in the asymptotic behavior of
1
n
logD1+s(Pf(An),En‖Pmix,f(An) × PEn). (3)
This is likened to error exponent or reliability function analysis in classical information theory [13], [14]. We
study this in Section IV.
3) Finally, in Section V, we also study the second-order asymptotics [15], [16] of the decay of D1+s with the
blocklength, i.e., the asymptotic behavior of
1√
n
D1+s(Pf(An),En‖Pmix,f(An) × PEn), and (4)
1√
n
logD1+s(Pf(An),En‖Pmix,f(An) × PEn). (5)
where the number of compressed symbols (size of the hash function) ‖f‖ equals enR+
√
nL for some first-
order rate R (usually the conditional Re´nyi entropy) and second-order rate L ∈ R. For some cases (Re´nyi
parameter less than one) where we cannot exactly determine the tight second-order asymptotics (i.e., the
upper and lower bounds do not match), we study the asymptotic behavior of (2) when the second-order rate
L tends to +∞ or −∞. In this case, the upper and lower bounds match up to and including a term quadratic
in L.
As we mentioned earlier, we will regard f as a random hash function in the sequel. That is, it is randomly
selected depending on a random variable Xn ∈ Xn that is available to all parties and is also independent of all
other random variables. This random variable has distribution PXn . See Fig. 1. To further elaborate, instead of the
3An En Xn ∼ PXn
? ? ?
fXn(·)
fXn(A
n) En Xn
Fig. 1. Illustration of applying a hash function fXn on the source A
n. Common randomness Xn, independent of a correlated source En,
is available to all parties and it determines the hash function fXn . We would like fXn(A
n) to be uniform on its support {1, . . . , ‖fXn‖}
and almost independent of En in the sense of ensuring that quantity in (2) is small. We examine (2) under different asymptotic regimes
such as the equivocation, the exponential behavior (3), and the second-order asymptotics (4)–(5).
the Re´nyi divergences in (2)–(5), for the purposes of asserting the existence of a particular function f with some
desired properties (cf. the random selection argument), we consider the quantity
D
(n)
1+s := D1+s(PfXn (An),En,Xn‖Pmix,fXn (An) × PEn × PXn). (6)
Here, we note that fXn is a random hash function (to be defined precisely in Definition 1) and ‖fXn(An)‖ is a
constant random variable, i.e., it does not depend on the realization of Xn. Even though D
(n)
1+s in (6) is not an
expectation of any quantity of interest, exp
(
(1 + s)D
(n)
1+s
)
is the expectation of
D˜
(n)
1+s(xn) := exp
(
(1 + s)D1+s(Pfxn (An),En‖Pmix,fxn (An) × PEn)
)
, (7)
where the probability of observing xn is PXn(xn). Thus by a random selection argument, if the former is less than
ε > 0, there exist an x∗n ∈ Xn, indexing a deterministic protocol fx∗n , such that D˜(n)1+s(x∗n) is also less than ε. When
s = 0, the expectation of quantities in (2)–(5) under the common randomness Xn generating a universal2 hash
function fXn(·) is equivalent to the quantity in (6) but for s 6= 0, they are, in general, different. In the sequel, we
adopt the latter criterion in (6) to simplify the presentation of the results.
We believe the results contained herein may serve as logical starting points to derive tight exponential error bounds
and second-order coding rates for the wiretap channel [12] (as was done in [17], [18]) and other information-theoretic
security problems such as the secret key agreement [19] (as was done in [20], [21]) problem. The leakage rates for
these problems may be measured using traditional Shannon information measures or Re´nyi information measures
(or their Gallager-type counterparts). Here, we are only concerned with the secrecy requirement rather than both
the secrecy and reliability requirements of the wiretap problem. The reliability requirement can be handled using,
by now, standard error exponent analyses [13], [14].
C. Related Works
In [17], [22], Hayashi generalized and strengthened the seminal privacy amplification analyses of Bennett et al.
[7], Renner [23] and Renner and Wolf [24] to obtain exponential error bounds for the leakage rate of the discrete
memoryless wiretap channel and the secrey key agreement problems [2], [3], [12], [19]. The leakage rate was
measured by the mutual information I(A∧E|PAE) and the variational (or trace) distance ‖PAE−PA×PE‖1. The
exact exponents for the variational distance are, by now, well known [18], [25].
However, the results concerning the exponential decay of the leakage rate quantified via the mutual information
contained in [17], and further generalized to other setings in [20], [21], are only achievability results (i.e., lower
bounds on the exponents). The converse has been open for some time. The present contribution, though not focusing
on the wiretap channel or any specific information-theoretic security problem, derives tight exponential bounds for
a generalization of the Shannon information measures, namely the family of Re´nyi information measures. In the
process, we obtain a tight result for the exponential leakage rate for the mutual information, thus resolving the
converse part that was open in [17], [20], [21]. As a by-product, for some range of the Re´nyi parameter, we also
obtain tight exponents for security measures defined using the Re´nyi divergence under various hash functions.
Hayashi and Tsurumaru [26] proposed an efficient construction of hash functions for the purpose of privacy
amplification with less random seeds, thus potentially realizing the system in Fig. 1 with less random resources.
Other works along the lines of deriving exponential error bounds for information-theoretic security problems include
those by Hou and Kramer [27], [28], Pierrot and Bloch [29], Bloch and Laneman [30], Han et al. [31] and Parizi
4and Telatar [32]. After the present work was submitted, Parizi, Telatar and Merhav [33] proved ensemble tight
exponential error bounds for the wiretap channel by appealing to type counting methods and channel resolvability
arguments.
D. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we state the relevant preliminaries and define
relevant information measures and security criteria for understanding the rest of the paper. In Section III, we
state our results for the asymptotics of the equivocation. In Section IV, we state our results for the exponential
behavior of the Re´nyi-type security criteria. In Section V, we state our results for the second-order asymptotics
of the equivocation. We also consider the case where the magnitudes of the second-order rates are large. These
are proved using novel one-shot bounds which are stated in Section VI. The proofs of the asymptotic results are
provided in Section VII. We conclude the paper in Section VIII by summarizing our key contributions and stating
avenues for further investigations. The proofs of the one-shot bounds are rather technical and are thus relegated to
the Appendices.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND INFORMATION MEASURES
A. Basic Shannon and Re´nyi Information Quantities
We now introduce some information measures that generalize Shannon’s information measures. Fix a normalized
distribution PA ∈ P(A) and a non-negative measure (a non-negative vector but not necessarily summing to one)
QA ∈ P¯(A) supported on a finite set A. Then the relative entropy and the Re´nyi divergence of order 1 + s are
respectively defined as
D(PA‖QA) :=
∑
a∈A
PA(a) log
PA(a)
QA(a)
(8)
D1+s(PA‖QA) := 1
s
log
∑
a∈A
PA(a)
1+sQA(a)
−s, (9)
where throughout, log is to the natural base e. It is known that lims→0D1+s(PA‖QA) = D(PA‖QA) so a special
case of the Re´nyi divergence is the usual relative entropy. It is known that the map s 7→ sD1+s(PA‖QA) is
concave in s ∈ R and hence D1+s(PA‖QA) is monotonically increasing for s ∈ R. Furthermore, the following
data processing or information processing inequalities for Re´nyi divergences hold for s ∈ [−1, 1],
D(PAW‖QAW ) ≤ D(PA‖QA) (10)
D1+s(PAW‖QAW ) ≤ D1+s(PA‖QA). (11)
Here W : A → B is any stochastic matrix (channel) and PAW (b) :=
∑
aW (b|a)PA(a) is the output distribution
induced by W and PA.
We use Pmix,A to denote the uniform distribution on A. We also introduce conditional entropies on the joint
alphabet A × E . If PAE is a distribution on A × E , the conditional entropy and the conditional Re´nyi entropy of
order 1 + s relative to another normalized distribution QE on E as
H(A|E|PAE‖QE) := −D(PAE‖IA ×QE), (12)
H1+s(A|E|PAE‖QE) := −D1+s(PAE‖IA ×QE). (13)
Here IA(a) = 1 for each a ∈ A and it is known that lims→0H1+s(A|E|PAE‖QE) = H(A|E|PAE‖QE). If
QE = PE , we simplify the notation and denote the conditional entropy and the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order
1 + s as
H(A|E|PAE) := H(A|E|PAE‖PE) = −
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e) logPA|E(a|e) (14)
H1+s(A|E|PAE) := H1+s(A|E|PAE‖PE) = −1
s
log
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s. (15)
5The function s 7→ sH1+s(A|E|PAE) is concave, and H1+s(A|E|PAE‖QE) is monotonically decreasing on (0,∞)
and (−∞, 0).
We are also interested in the so-called Gallager form of the conditional Re´nyi entropy for a joint distribution
PAE ∈ P(A× E):
H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) := −
1 + s
s
log
∑
e
(∑
a
PAE(a, e)
1+s
) 1
1+s
. (16)
By defining the familiar Gallager function [13], [34] (parametrized slightly differently)
φ(s|A|E|PAE) := log
∑
e
(∑
a
PAE(a, e)
1
1−s
)1−s
(17)
we can express (16) as
H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) = −
1 + s
s
φ
(
s
1 + s
∣∣∣A|E|PAE), (18)
thus (loosely) justifying the nomenclature “Gallager form” of the conditional Re´nyi entropy in (16). The quantities
H1+s and H
↑
1+s can be shown to be related as follows:
max
QE∈P(E)
H1+s(A|E|PAE‖QE) = H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) (19)
for s ∈ [−1,∞) \ {0}. The maximum on the left-hand-side is attained for the tilted distribution
QE(e) =
(
∑
a PAE(a, e)
1+s)
1
1+s∑
e(
∑
a PAE(a, e)
1+s)
1
1+s
. (20)
The map s → sH↑1+s(A|E|PAE) is concave and the map s 7→ H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) is monotonically decreasing for
s ∈ (−1,∞). It can be shown by L’Hoˆpital’s rule that
lim
s→0
H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) = H(A|E|PAE). (21)
Thus, we regard H↑1 (A|E|PAE) as H(A|E|PAE), i.e., for Re´nyi parameter α = 1 + s = 1, the conditional Re´nyi
entropy and its Gallager form coincide. We also find it useful to consider a two-parameter family of the conditional
Re´nyi entropy:
H1+s|1+t(A|E|PAE) := −
1 + t
s
log
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
) 1
1+t
. (22)
Clearly,
H1+s|1+s(A|E|PAE) = H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) (23)
so two-parameter conditional Re´nyi entropy is a generalization of the Gallager form of the conditional Re´nyi entropy
in (16).
For a fixed joint source PAE define
Rˆs :=
d
dt
tH1+t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣∣
t=s
, and (24)
Rˆ↑s :=
d
dt
tH↑1+t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣∣
t=s
. (25)
We note that Rˆs and Rˆ
↑
s are monotonically non-increasing in s because the functions t 7→ tH1+t(A|E|PAE) and t 7→
tH↑1+t(A|E|PAE) are concave. The fact that t 7→ −tH↑1+t(A|E|PAE) is convex is because the maximum of convex
functions is convex; cf. (19). Furthermore, both Rˆs and Rˆ
↑
s are non-negative by direct evaluation of the derivatives
and noting that logPA|E(a|e) ≤ 0. We assume, henceforth, that the source PAE satisfies the conditions that
t 7→ tH1+t(A|E|PAE) and t 7→ tH↑1+t(A|E|PAE) are both strictly concave so Rˆs and Rˆ↑s are both monotonically
decreasing in s.
6The Re´nyi entropies can be shown to satisfy a form of data processing inequality. In particular if f : A →M
is any function on the set A, we have
H(f(A)|E|PAE) ≤ H(A|E|PAE), (26)
H1+s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≤ H1+s(A|E|PAE), (27)
H↑1+s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≤ H↑1+s(A|E|PAE). (28)
Inequalities (27) and (28) hold true for all s > −1. These inequalities say that processing the random variable A
cannot increase its randomness measured under any of the above conditional Re´nyi entropies.
B. Re´nyi Security Criteria
Now, we introduce various criteria that measure independence and uniformity jointly. The mutual information is
I(A ∧ E|PAE) := D(PAE‖PA × PE). (29)
This, together with its normalized version, has been traditionally used as measure of dependence in classical
information-theoretic security [2], [3], going back to the seminal work of Wyner [12] for the wiretap channel. It
was also used by Ahlswede and Csisza´r for the secret key agreement problem [19]. However, it does not guarantee
approximate uniformity of the source PA on A. Thus, we introduce the modified mutual information
C(A|E|PAE) := D(PAE‖Pmix,A × PE) (30)
= log |A| −H(A|E|PAE). (31)
This quantity was also considered by Csisza´r and Narayan [35, Eq. (6)] in their work on secrecy capacities. An
axiomatic justification of C(A|E|PAE) was provided recently by Hayashi [36, Thm. 8]. The modified mutual
information C(A|E|PAE) clearly satisfies
C(A|E|PAE) = I(A ∧ E|PAE) +D(PA‖Pmix,A). (32)
Hence, if C(A|E|PAE) is small, A is approximately independent of E and A is approximately uniform on its
alphabet, desirable properties in information-theoretic security. We may further generalize the modified mutual
information by considering Re´nyi information measures, introduced in Section II-A, as follows:
C1+s(A|E|PAE) := D1+s(PAE‖Pmix,A × PE) (33)
= log |A| −H1+s(A|E|PAE). (34)
This can be relaxed to give yet another security measure—the Gallager-form of the modified mutual information:
C↑1+s(A|E|PAE) := min
QE∈P(E)
D1+s(PAE‖Pmix,A ×QE) (35)
= log |A| −H↑1+s(A|E|PAE). (36)
We characterize these quantities asymptotically when (A,E) ≡ (f(An), En) for some (classes of) hash functions
f(·). The quantities H1+s and H↑1+s can be regarded as equivocations [12] so C1+s and C↑1+s are the negative of
the equivocations up to a shift. We work with C1+s and C
↑
1+s in the rest of the paper as they are more convenient
and they admit the interpretation as security criteria.
C. Decomposition of the Re´nyi Security Criteria into Mutual Information and Divergence Terms
We note that for any s ≥ −1, C1+s(A|E|PAE) = 0 if and only if PAE = Pmix,A × PE or equivalently, A is
uniform on A and statistically independent of E. This is because D1+s(P‖Q) is a divergence so D1+s(P‖Q) = 0
if and only if P = Q [37]. The same is true for the case C↑1+s(A|E|PAE) = 0. From this observation, we see that
C1+s(A|E|PAE) and C↑1+s(A|E|PAE) also measure how close the source or “key” A is to uniform and how secure
A is from an adversary E. Thus the quantities we consider are generalizations of the standard security measure
C(A|E|PAE) in (32) and measure uniformity and security in a different way.
7More quantitatively, one may wonder whether the security criteria C1+s(A|E|PAE) and C↑1+s(A|E|PAE) ad-
mit a decomposition into “mutual information” and “divergence” terms and similar to (32). We first consider
C1+s(A|E|PAE). Define gs(a) :=
∑
e PAE(a, e)
1+sPE(e)
−s. We then see from the definition of the Re´nyi diver-
gence of order (1 + s) that
esD1+s(PAE‖Pmix,A×PE)
=
( 1
|A|
)−s∑
a
(∑
e
PAE(a, e)
1+sPE(e)
−s
)
(37)
=
( 1
|A|
)−s∑
a
(
gs(a)
1
1+s
)1+s
(38)
=
( 1
|A|
)−s(∑
a′
gs(a
′)
1
1+s
)1+s∑
a
(
gs(a)
1
1+s∑
a′ gs(a
′)
1
1+s
)1+s
. (39)
As a result, one has
D1+s(PAE‖Pmix,A × PE) = 1 + s
s
log
∑
a′
gs(a
′)
1
1+s +
1
s
log
∑
a
(
gs(a)
1
1+s∑
a′ gs(a
′)
1
1+s
)1+s
+ log |A|. (40)
Invoking the definition of gs(a), we see that the first term can be rewritten as
1 + s
s
log
∑
a′
gs(a
′)
1
1+s =
1 + s
s
log
∑
a′
PA(a
′)
(∑
e
PE|A(e|a′)1+sPE(e)−s
) 1
1+s
(41)
=: I
(Sibson)
1+s (E ∧A|PAE). (42)
This is exactly Sibson’s definition of the order-(1 + s) Re´nyi mutual information [38]. See Verdu´’s work in [39,
Sec. III] for the properties of I(Sibson)1+s (E ∧ A|PAE) and a generalization to arbitrary alphabets. See Hayashi’s
work [40, Sec. II.C] for a generalization of I(Sibson)1+s (E ∧ A|PAE) to quantum systems. The work of Tomamichel
and Hayashi in [41, Sec. IV.B] provides an operational interpretation of this quantity in the context of composite
hypothesis testing. The sum of the second and third terms in (40) form a Re´nyi divergence of order (1 + s).
In particular, the second term is the negative Re´nyi entropy of order (1 + s) of the probability mass function
Q
(s)
A (a) := gs(a)
1
1+s /
∑
a′ gs(a
′)
1
1+s . Hence,
D1+s(PAE‖Pmix,A × PE) = I(Sibson)1+s (E ∧A|PAE) +D1+s
(
Q
(s)
A ‖Pmix,A
)
. (43)
Because Q(0)A = PA, and lims→0 I
(Sibson)
1+s (E∧A|PAE) = I(A∧E|PAE), the decomposition in (43) is a generalization
of (32). Equation (43) is also reminiscent of an information geometric Pythagorean theorem [42] (but for Re´nyi
divergence here). The distribution Q(s)A ×PE can be regarded as the D1+s-information projection of PAE onto the
set {QA × PE : QA ∈ P(A)}. This was observed in the quantum information context by Sharma and Warsi [43,
Lemma 3 in Suppl. Mat.]. They called the relation the quantum Sibson identity.
Next we consider the Gallager-form of the modified mutual information C↑1+s(A|E|PAE). From (36), it can be
seen by adding and subtracting H1+s(A|PA) that
C↑1+s(A|E|PAE) = H1+s(A|PA)−H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) +D1+s(PA‖Pmix,A). (44)
We recognize that the sum of the first two terms constitutes Arimoto’s [44] definition of the order-(1 + s) Re´nyi
mutual information
I
(Arimoto)
1+s (A ∧ E|PAE) = H1+s(A|PA)−H↑1+s(A|E|PAE). (45)
Since lims→0 I
(Arimoto)
1+s (A ∧ E|PAE) = I(A ∧ E|PAE), the security criterion C↑1+s(A|E|PAE) also admits a
decomposition similar to (32). See [39, Sec. II.A] for detailed discussions of the properties of I(Arimoto)1+s (A∧E|PAE).
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Fig. 2. Schematic showing the relation between the various entropies and the transition rate Rˆ−s (defined in (24) and (51)). The figure
with the Gallager forms of the conditional Re´nyi entropy H↑1±s and Rˆ
↑
−s (defined in (25) and (52)) is completely analogous. See Fig. 4.
III. ASYMPTOTICS OF THE EQUIVOCATION
In this section we present our results concerning the asymptotic behavior of the equivocation. First we define
precisely the notion of hash function. This is a generalization of the definition by Carter and Wegman [1].
Definition 1. A random1 hash function fX is a stochastic map from A to M := {1, . . . ,M}, where X denotes a
random variable describing its stochastic behavior. An ensemble of random hash functions fX is called an -almost
universal2 hash function if it satisfies the following condition: For any distinct a1, a2 ∈ A,
Pr
(
fX(a1) = fX(a2)
) ≤ 
M
. (46)
When  = 1, we simply say that the ensemble of functions is a universal2 hash function.
As an example, if we randomly and uniformly assign each element of a ∈ A into one of M bins indexed by
m ∈M (i.e., the familiar random binning process introduced by Cover [45]), then Pr(fX(a1) = fX(a1)) = 1M so
this is a universal2 hash function, and furthermore, (46) is achieved with equality.
Let |t|+ = max{0, t}. The following is our first main result.
Theorem 1 (Asymptotics of the Equivocation). Let2 Mn = enR. Assume that fXn : An →Mn = {1, . . . ,Mn} is
a random hash function.3 For any s ∈ [0, 1], we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
inf
fXn
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = |R−H1+s(A|E|PAE)|+, (47)
lim
n→∞
1
n
inf
fXn
C↑1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = |R−H↑1+s(A|E|PAE)|+. (48)
Furthermore, for any s ∈ (0, 1], we also have
lim
n→∞
1
n
inf
fXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) =
{
R−H1−s(A|E|PAE) R ≥ Rˆ−s
maxt∈[0,s] ts(R−H1−t(A|E|PAE)) R ≤ Rˆ−s
, (49)
lim
n→∞
1
n
inf
fXn
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) =
{
R−H↑1−s(A|E|PAE) R ≥ Rˆ↑−s
maxt∈[0,s] ts(R−H1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)) R ≤ Rˆ↑−s
, (50)
1For brevity, we will sometimes omit the qualifier “random”. It is understood, henceforth, that all so-mentioned hash functions are random
hash functions.
2As is usual in information theory, we ignore the integer effects on the size of the hash function Mn = ‖f‖ since this is inconsequential
asymptotically. This imprecision is also employed in the sequel for notational convenience.
3In particular, all the infima in (47)–(50) (as well as similar statements in the sequel) are taken over all fXn that are random hash functions.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the security measures C1+s and C1−s (for s ∈ [0, 1]) in (47) and (49) for the discrete memoryless multiple source
PAE where PAE(0, 0) = 0.7 and PAE(0, 1) = PAE(1, 0) = PAE(1, 1) = 0.1.
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the security measures C↑1+s and C
↑
1−s (for s ∈ [0, 1]) in (48) and (50) respectively for the same source.
where recall that Rˆ−s and Rˆ
↑
−s are defined in (24) and (25) respectively. (Also see (51) and (52) for alternative
representations.) Furthermore, the infima in (47)–(50) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal2 hash
functions fXn (where  is a fixed positive number).
This result is proved in Section VII-A. The ideas to prove the direct parts (upper bounds on the leakage rates)
for the s = 0 cases are contained in previous works such as [17], [20], [21]. All other parts are novel.
We remark that the converse parts (lower bounds) to (47)–(48) hold for all s ≥ 0 (and not only being upper
bounded by 1) owing to the data processing inequalities in (27)–(28). Furthermore, instead of the formulae in (24)
and (25), the rates in which the behavior of the security measures change Rˆ−s and Rˆ
↑
−s can also be expressed as
Rˆ−s =
d
dt
tH1−t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣∣
t=s
, and (51)
Rˆ↑−s =
d
dt
tH↑1−t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣∣
t=s
. (52)
These alternative expressions for Rˆ−s and Rˆ
↑
−s will be useful in the proof of Theorem 1.
The results in (47)–(50) imply that an optimum sequence of hash functions {fXn}n∈N is such that asymptotically
the normalized security measure C1+s and its Gallager-type counterpart C
↑
1+s increase linearly with the rate R if
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the rate is larger than the conditional Re´nyi entropy and its Gallager-type counterpart. However, note that this only
holds for the case where R is greater than the analogue of the critical rates, defined in (24)–(25) in the case where
the Re´nyi parameter α = 1− s is less than one. Observe that there is difference in behavior when we consider the
other direction, i.e., the quantities C1−s and C
↑
1−s for s ∈ [0, 1]. Below the critical rate, the equivocation no longer
increases linearly with R but is nonetheless still convex in R. See Fig. 2 for a schematic of the various rates and
the behavior of the equivocations. We numerically calculate the asymptotics of the equivocations in Theorem 1
and display the results in Figs. 3 and 4. The behaviors of the normalized security measure C1+s, C1−s and their
Gallager-type counterparts C↑1+s, C
↑
1−s are similar.
Finally, we examine the optimal (maximum) key generation rates, i.e., the largest rates R for which there exists a
sequence of functions from An to {1, . . . , enR} such that 1nC1+s or 1nC↑1+s tend to zero as the blocklength grows.
We observe from the following corollary that this cutoff rate depends strongly on the sign of s. In particular for
s ∈ (0, 1], the cutoff rates are H1+s(A|E|PAE) and H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) respectively, while for s ∈ [−1, 0], the cutoff
rates are both equal to the Shannon conditional entropy H(A|E|PAE) independent of s. This difference between
the behaviors of the optimal key generation rates depending on the sign of s (also illustrated in Figs. 3 and 4) is
somewhat surprising (at least to the authors).
Corollary 1 (Optimal key generation rates). We have
sup
{
R ∈ R+ : lim
n→∞ inff :An→{1,...,enR}
C1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
n
= 0
}
=
{
H1+s(A|E|PAE) if s ∈ (0, 1]
H(A|E|PAE) if s ∈ [−1, 0] , (53)
sup
{
R ∈ R+ : lim
n→∞ inff :An→{1,...,enR}
C↑1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
n
= 0
}
=
{
H↑1+s(A|E|PAE) if s ∈ (0, 1]
H(A|E|PAE) if s ∈ [−1, 0] . (54)
Proof: We only prove the statement for C1+s in (53) since that for C
↑
1+s in (54) is completely analogous. The
case for s ∈ (0, 1] is obvious from (47) in Theorem 1 since the limit is |R − H1+s(A|E|PAE)|+. Now, for the
case s ∈ [−1, 0], if R ≤ H(A|E|PAE), we know from the monotonically decreasing nature of H1+s(A|E|PAE)
(in s) that R −H1−t(A|E|PAE) is non-positive for t ∈ [0, s]. Thus, referring to (49) in Theorem 1, the optimal t
in the optimization maxt∈[0,s] ts(R−H1−t(A|E|PAE)) is attained at t = 0 and consequently, the optimal objective
value is 0. On the other hand, for any R > H(A|E|PAE), the optimal t ∈ (0, s] and so the optimal objective
value is (strictly) positive. Thus, for s ∈ [−1, 0], the optimal key generation rate is the Shannon conditional entropy
H(A|E|PAE). This concludes the proof for (53).
In Section I-A, we alluded to the importance of the collision entropy H2 in cryptography and QKD. The
implication of (53) in Corollary 1 is that if we operate at a hashing rate R > H2 and we employ the security
criterion C2, then there will inevitably be some residual leakage of the source An given a hashed version f(An)
and side-information En.
Because of the normalizations of C1+s and C
↑
1+s by n in (53) and (54), Corollary 1 is analogous to results in the
vast majority of the literature in information-theoretic security [2], [3] where the weak secrecy criterion is employed.
We address the analogue of the strong secrecy criterion [46] in Theorem 2 to follow where we not only demand
that the unnormalized quantities C1+s and C
↑
1+s vanish with n, we also demand that they do so exponentially fast
and we identify the exponents.
IV. EXPONENTIAL BEHAVIOR OF THE SECURITY MEASURES
In this section, we evaluate the exponential rates of decay of the security measures C1±s and C
↑
1±s for fixed
rates R above an analogue of the critical rate.
Theorem 2 (Exponents of the Equivocation). Let Mn = enR. Assume that fXn : An →Mn = {1, . . . ,Mn} is a
random hash function. For R ≥ Rˆ1 (Rˆs being defined in (24)), and any s ∈ [0, 1], we have
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log inf
fXn
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) =
∣∣∣∣∣ supt∈[s,1) tH1+t(A|E|PAE)− tR
∣∣∣∣∣
+
, (55)
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log inf
fXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = max
t∈[0,1]
tH1+t(A|E|PAE)− tR. (56)
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the exponents of the security measures C1+s and C1−s (for s ∈ [0, 1]) in (55) and (56) respectively for the
discrete memoryless multiple source PAE as in Fig. 3. The curves for C1/2 and C1 are identical and they are equal to zero for all rates
R ≥ H1 = 0.4400 bits per source symbol (cf. Corollary 1).
For the Gallager-type counterparts of the Re´nyi quantities and R ≥ Rˆ↑1 (Rˆ↑s being defined in (25)), and any
s ∈ [0, 1], we also have
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log inf
fXn
C↑1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) =
∣∣∣∣maxt∈[s,1] tH1+t(A|E|PAE)− tR
∣∣∣∣+ , (57)
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log inf
fXn
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = max
t∈[0,1]
tH1+t(A|E|PAE)− tR. (58)
The infima in (55)–(58) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal2 hash functions fXn .
This result is proved in Section VII-B. The techniques for the direct parts are somewhat similar to those in
[17], [21], [22] using improved versions of Bennett et al.’s [7] bound which was based on the Re´nyi entropy of
order 2. However, the non-asymptotic bounds (e.g., Lemma 5) and asymptotic evaluations for the converse parts
require new ideas. Different from the direct part, we need to convert the evaluation of e−sC1−s and e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s into
information spectrum [47] quantities (involving the conditional entropy random variable) so that is is amenable to
asymptotic evaluation. These information spectrum quantities are then evaluated using various large deviation [48]
bounds, such as Cramer’s theorem. We make several other observations.
First, the exponents of the security indices (namely − 1n logC1±s and − 1n logC↑1±s) are non-negative because
C1±s ≤ log |fXn(An)| = O(n) and C↑1±s ≤ log |fXn(An)| = O(n) (cf. their definitions in (34) and (36)). The
expressions in (56) and (58) are already nonnegative and so we only need to include the | · |+ operation for (55)
and (57).
Second, the derivative of the conditional Re´nyi entropies Rˆ1 and Rˆ
↑
1 are the analogues of the critical rate in
error exponent analysis [13], [14]. For the exponents, we have a complete characterization of the exponential rates
of decay of both C1±s and C
↑
1±s for s ∈ [0, 1] and they are given by optimization of quantities that are related
to the conditional Re´nyi entropy. We observe that the Gallager form results in larger exponents in general as the
optimizations in (56) and (58) are larger than their non-Gallager counterparts in (55) and (57) respectively.
Finally, the exponents in (55) and (56) of Theorem 2 are illustrated in Fig. 5. We observe the same behavior for
the exponents of the Gallager forms in (57) and (58) since the expressions are the same and so we omit these cases.
We note (from the plot and from direct evaluations) that the zero-crossings for the exponents of C1/2, C1, C3/2 and
C7/4 occur at H1, H1, H3/2 and H7/4 respectively (H1 being the Shannon entropy). This is in line with Corollary 1.
Indeed, the exponent being positive implies that the normalized security measures 1nC1±s and
1
nC
↑
1±s vanish as
blocklength grows. Thus, we conclude that the optimal key generation rates under both the strong and weak secrecy
criteria are the same.
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V. SECOND-ORDER ASYMPTOTICS
In the previous sections, the security measures in terms of equivocations and their logarithms were normalized
by the blocklength n. In this section, we study different normalizations, e.g., by
√
n. In addition, we examine the
effect of changing the size of the hash function Mn from enR (considered in Sections III and IV) to enR+
√
nL,
where L ∈ R is an arbitrary real number.
A. Basic Definitions
To present our results, we first define the following important quantities.
Definition 2. Given a discrete joint source PAE ∈ P(A×E), define the conditional varentropy [49] or conditional
source dispersion [50], [51] to be
V (A|E|PAE) :=
∑
a,e
PAE(a, e)
(
logPA|E(a|e) +H(A|E|PAE)
)2
. (59)
We also define the following variants of the conditional varentropy
V1(A|E|PAE) :=
∑
e
PE(e)
(
H(A|E|PAE)−H(A|PA|E=e)
)2 (60)
V2(A|E|PAE) := V (A|E|PAE)− V1(A|E|PAE) (61)
=
∑
a,e
PAE(a, e)
(
logPA|E(a|e) +H(A|PA|E=e)
)2
. (62)
One can readily check that V = V1 + V2 from the definitions. This also follows immediately from the law of
total variance. Let
Φ(t) :=
1√
2pi
∫ t
−∞
e−u
2/2 du (63)
be the cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian random variable. With these definitions, we are
ready to state our results on the second-order asymptotics for the security measures C1+s and C
↑
1+s which are simple
functions of the equivocation H1+s and H
↑
1+s respectively. Note that the second-order analysis of C1 (corresponding
to the s = 0 case) with no side information (i.e., E = ∅) was performed in Hayashi’s work [16, Theorem 8] in
the context of intrinsic randomness based on the relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence) criterion. The other
results in Theorems 3 and 4 are novel.
To state our result succinctly, we define the quantities which all depend on s, L and PAE (but we suppress the
dependence on the fixed joint distribution PAE for brevity):
Γ1(s, L) := −1
s
log
(
2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)
)
− 1
s
log Φ
(
− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
, (64)
Γ2(s, L) := −1− s
s
log Φ
(
− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
, (65)
Ψ1(s, L) := −1
s
log
(
2s+
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)
)
− 1− s
s
log
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
− L+ x√
V2(A|E|PAE)
) 1
1−s e−x2/(2V1(A|E|PAE))√
2piV1(A|E|PAE)
dx, (66)
Ψ2(s, L) := −1− s
s
log Φ
(
− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
. (67)
B. Bounds on the Second-Order Asymptotics
Theorem 3 (Second-Order Asymptotics). Assume that fXn : An →Mn = {1, . . . ,Mn} is a random hash function.
Consider the following three cases:
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• Case (A): α = 1 + s with s ∈ (0, 1]: Suppose that the number of messages Mn = enH1+s(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL or
Mn = e
nH↑1+s(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL. When L ≥ 0, we have
lim
n→∞
1√
n
inf
fXn
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = L (68)
lim
n→∞
1√
n
inf
fXn
C↑1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = L. (69)
Similarly to Theorem 1, the infima in (68) and (69) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal2 hash
functions fXn .
When L ≤ 0, we have
lim
n→∞−
1√
n
log inf
fXn
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = −sL (70)
lim
n→∞−
1√
n
log inf
fXn
C↑1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = −sL. (71)
Similarly to Theorem 2, the infima in (70) and (71) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal2 hash
functions fXn .
• Case (B): α = 1 (i.e., s = 0): Suppose that Mn = enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL for some L ∈ R, we have
lim
n→∞
1√
n
inf
fXn
C1(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) =
∫ L/√V (A|E|PAE)
−∞
L−√V (A|E|PAE)x√
2pi
e−x
2/2 dx. (72)
By (21), the same asymptotic behavior also holds true for the Gallager version of the security measure
C↑1 (fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn). Similarly to Theorem 1, the infima in (72) is achieved by any sequence of
-almost universal2 hash functions fXn .
• Case (C): α = 1− s with s ∈ (0, 1]: Suppose that Mn = enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL for some L ∈ R, we have
max {Γ1(s, L),Γ2(s, L)} ≤ lim inf
n→∞ inffXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
inf
fXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) ≤
Γ2(s, L)
1− s . (73)
In addition, for the Gallager-type counterparts, with Mn = enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL for some L ∈ R, we also have
max{Ψ1(s, L),Ψ2(s, L)}
≤ lim inf
n→∞ inffXn
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
inf
fXn
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
≤ Ψ1(s, L) + 1
s
log
(
2s+
1
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)
)
. (74)
The upper bounds in (73) and (74) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal2 has functions fXn .
This result is proved in Section VII-C. We remark that the converse parts (lower bounds) to (68)–(69) hold for
all s ≥ 0 (and not only being upper bounded by 1) owing to the data processing inequalities in (27)–(28).
C. Remarks on Theorem 3
Observe that in Theorem 3 (Case (A) for instance), the number of compressed symbols Mn satisfies
logMn = nH1+s(A|E|PAE) +
√
nL, or, (75)
logMn = nH
↑
1+s(A|E|PAE) +
√
nL. (76)
The leading conditional Re´nyi entropy terms scaling in n are known as the first-order terms, while the terms scaling
as
√
n are known as the second-order terms. The coefficient L is known as the second-order coding rate [16],
[52], [53] and the second-order asymptotic characterizations depend on L. Note that even though L is termed as
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Fig. 6. Illustration of the second-order asymptotics in Case (B) given by the right-hand-side of (72) for the discrete memoryless multiple
source PAE as in Fig. 3. It is easy to see that the integral there is non-negative.
the second-order coding rate, it may be negative. Observe that the conditional varentropies appear in (72)–(74),
which suggests that we evaluate the one-shot bounds using the central limit theorem among other techniques. We
have tight results (equalities) for Cases (A) and (B) but unfortunately not for Case (C) where the Re´nyi parameter
α = 1− s for s ∈ (0, 1]. However, in the limit of the second-order coding rate L being large (either in the positive
or negative direction), we can assert that one of the terms in the maxima in the lower bounds of (73) and (74)
dominates and matches the upper bound and hence, we have a tight result up to the term in L2 (Theorem 4). We
now comment specifically on each of the cases.
1) For Case (A), the second-order asymptotic behaviors of C1+s and C
↑
1+s when they are normalized by
1√
n
are linear in L.
2) The same is true for Case (B) for large positive L because with V := V (A|E|PAE),
lim
L→∞
1
L
·
∫ L/√V
−∞
L−√V x√
2pi
e−x
2/2 dx = lim
L→∞
{
Φ
( L√
V
)
−
√
V
L
∫ L/√V
−∞
xe−x2/2√
2pi
dx
}
= 1. (77)
In contrast, when L→ −∞ in Case (B), the limit is zero. The second-order asymptotics in Case (B) in (72)
is shown in Fig. 6 and is obtained via numerical integration to approximate the integral. The limit in (72) is
monotonically increasing in L. This is intuitive because as L increases, there is potentially more leakage to
En and less uniformity on the (larger) support {1, . . . , enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL}.
3) For Case (C) there is no normalization by 1√
n
and we only have bounds. However, for large |L|, we will see
from Theorem 4 that the second-order asymptotic behavior is quadratic in L. The bounds on the second-order
asymptotics in the two parts (conditional Re´nyi entropy and its Gallager version) of Case (C) in (73) and (74)
are shown in Figs. 7 and 8 respectively.
We conclude that in the second-order asymptotic regime where the number of compressed symbols satisfies (75)–
(76), there are distinct differences between the three regimes of the Re´nyi parameter α ∈ [0, 1), α = 1 and
α ∈ (1, 2].
D. Approximations for Large Second-Order Coding Rates
Since for Case (C) we only have bounds, we now examine the behavior of the bounds in the limit of large |L|
for which we can show tight results up to the quadratic terms.
Theorem 4 (Large Second-Order Rates). Assume that fXn : An →Mn = {1, . . . ,Mn} is a random hash function.
For Case (C) in Theorem 3 (Re´nyi parameter α = 1− s where s ∈ (0, 1]), we have the following asymptotic results
15
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Positive L
Second−order rate L
Se
co
nd
−o
rd
er
 a
sy
m
pt
ot
ics
 
 
Lower Bound 1
Lower Bound 2
Upper Bound
Quadratic Approx
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0
−16
−14
−12
−10
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
Negative L
Second−order rate L
Lo
g 
of
 S
ec
on
d−
or
de
r a
sy
m
pt
ot
ics
 
 
Lower Bound 2
Upper Bound
Quadratic Approx
Fig. 7. Illustration of the bounds on the second-order asymptotics of C1/2(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE×PXn) (i.e., s = 1/2) in Case (C) given
by the left- and right-hand-sides of (73) for the same source. Note that the figure on the left is plotted in log scale (corresponding to (80))
while the figure on the right is plotted in linear scale. For L ≤ 0, lower bound 1 in (73) is negative (lower bound 2 dominates) so is not
shown in the left plot. Observe the quadratic behaviors; this is corroborated by Theorem 4. The quadratic approximations in (78) and (80)
(without the O(logL) terms) are also plotted. Observe that there is a constant offset between the quadratic and the bounds as we do not
determine the O(logL) terms in Theorem 4 exactly.
as L→∞:
lim
n→∞ inffXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) =
L2
2sV (A|E|PAE) +O(logL), (78)
lim
n→∞ inffXn
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) =
1− s
2s
· L
2
V1(A|E|PAE) + V2(A|E|PAE)(1− s) +O(logL). (79)
Furthermore, we have the following asymptotic results as L→ −∞:
lim
n→∞ log inffXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = −
L2
2V (A|E|PAE) +O(log |L|), (80)
lim
n→∞ log inffXn
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = −
L2
2V (A|E|PAE) +O(log |L|). (81)
The infima in (78)–(81) are achieved by any sequence of -almost universal2 hash functions fXn .
The proof of Theorem 4 can be found in Section V-E.
The results in Theorem 4 are somewhat analogous and similar those in the study of the moderate-deviations
asymptotics in information theory [54]–[58]. Note the difference between the results in (78)–(79) (L→∞) versus
(80)–(81) (L→ −∞). The former pair of results resembles the equivocation results presented in Section III since
the effective rate is (L/
√
n)-higher than the conditional Re´nyi entropy and there is no logarithm preceding C1−s
and C↑1−s. The latter pair of results resembles the exponent results of Section IV since the effective rate is (|L|/
√
n)-
lower than the conditional Re´nyi entropy and there is a logarithm preceding C1−s and C
↑
1−s. So the results presented
in Theorem 4 are natural in view of the equivocation result in Theorem 1 and the exponent result in Theorem 2.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 4. Since there are four statements in (78)–(81), we partition the
proof into four distinct subsections.
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Fig. 8. Illustration of the bounds on the second-order asymptotics of C↑1/2(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE×PXn) (i.e., s = 1/2) in Case (C) given
by the left- and right-hand-sides of (74) for the same source. For L ≤ 0, lower bound 1 in (74) is negative (lower bound 2 dominates) so
is not shown in the left plot. Observe the quadratic behaviors–this is corroborated by (79) and (81) in Theorem 4. These plots are obtained
by using numerical integration to calculate the integral in Ψ1(s, L) in (74).
a) Proof of (78): When L → ∞, the term Γ1(s, L) in (64) behaves as −1s log Φ
( − L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
+ O(1),
and attains the maximum in the lower bound in (73) because Γ2(s, L) has the additional factor 1 − s, which is
smaller than 1. Also see the right plot of Fig. 7. Thus, in this limiting regime, the lower bound matches the upper
bound in (73), namely −1s log Φ
(− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
, up to a constant term, i.e.,
lim
n→∞ inffXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = −
1
s
log Φ
(
− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
+O(1) (82)
where O(1) denotes a term bounded in L (but dependent on s). Now by employing the asymptotic equality
Φ(−t) = 1− Φ(t) ∼ e
−t2/2
√
2pit
, as t→∞, (83)
we obtain from (82) that
lim
n→∞ inffXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) =
L2
2sV (A|E|PAE) +O(logL), (84)
which proves (78).
b) Proof of (79): When L → ∞, the term Ψ1(s, L) dominates the maximum in the lower bound in (74)
because V2 ≤ V and thus the integrands in Ψ1(s, L), namely Φ
( − L+x√
V2(A|E|PAE)
) 1
1−s e−x
2/(2V1(A|E|PAE))√
2piV1(A|E|PAE)
, are not
smaller than Φ
(− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
in Ψ2(s, L). See right plot of Fig. 8. We can then find the x that dominates the
integral in Ψ1(s, L). We denote this by x∗. Since L is large, by (83),
log
[
Φ
(
− L+ x√
V2
) 1
1−s
e−x
2/(2V1)
]
−
[
− 1
2(1− s)
(
L+ x√
V2
)2
− x
2
2V1
]
→ 0, as L→∞. (85)
Differentiating the quadratic, we obtain
x∗ = − LV1(A|E|PAE)
V1(A|E|PAE) + (1− s)V2(A|E|PAE) . (86)
17
The exponential term e−(x∗)2/(2V1(A|E|PAE)) controls the behavior of the integral in Ψ1(s, L) and substituting (86)
into this exponential term yields (79).
c) Proof of (80): Now we assume that L → −∞. In this case, we find that the term Γ2(s, L) attains the
maximum in the lower bound in (73) because Γ1(s, L) is negative due to the constant negative term. Also see the
left plot of Fig. 7. In this case, taking the logarithm, we have
lim
n→∞ log inffXn
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
= log
[
− log
(
1− Φ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
))]
+O(1) (87)
= log
[
Φ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)]
+O(log |L|) (88)
= − L
2
2V (A|E|PAE) +O(log |L|) (89)
where in (87), log(1−ss ) and log(
1
s ) can be regarded as O(1) when L → −∞, in (88), we used the fact that
log(1− t) = −t+O(t2) when t ↓ 0, and finally in (89), we used (83). This proves (80).
d) Proof of (81): In the other direction, when L→ −∞, we claim that the term Ψ2(s, L) attains the maximum.
This is shown as follows: First, we find that
[
1− Φ
(
L+ x√
V2(A|E|PAE)
)] 1
1−s
≥ 1− 1
1− sΦ
(
L+ x√
V2(A|E|PAE)
)
. (90)
This is because a 7→ a 11−s is convex and so the linear approximation underestimates the function. This means that
log
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
− L+ x√
V2(A|E|PAE)
) 1
1−s e−x2/(2V1(A|E|PAE))√
2piV1(A|E|PAE)
dx
≥ log
∫ ∞
−∞
[
1− 1
1− sΦ
(
L+ x√
V2(A|E|PAE)
)]
e−x2/(2V1(A|E|PAE))√
2piV1(A|E|PAE)
dx (91)
= log
[
1− 1
1− sΦ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)]
(92)
= − 1
1− sΦ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
+O
(
e−L
4/(4V (A|E|PAE)2)
)
(93)
= − 1
1− s log
[
1− Φ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)]
+O
(
e−L
4/(4V (A|E|PAE)2)
)
(94)
= − 1
1− s log Φ
(
− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
+O
(
e−L
4/(4V (A|E|PAE)2)
)
, (95)
where (92) follows because the convolution of two independent zero-mean Gaussians is a Gaussian where the
variances add and we also note that V = V1+V2 per (61). This argument was also used in the second-order analysis
of channels with state [59, Lemma 18]. Inequalities (93) and (94) follow from the fact that log(1−x) = −x+O(x2)
as x ↓ 0 (note that L → −∞ so the term Φ(L/√V ) tends to zero). Hence, (95) and the definitions of Ψ2(s, L)
and Ψ1(s, L) (in (66) and (67) resp.) imply that Ψ2(s, L) asymptotically dominates Ψ1(s, L) as L → −∞. Also
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see left plot of Fig. 8. By a similar calculation as in (87)–(89), we obtain the lower bound to (81) as follows:
lim inf
n→∞ log inffXn
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
≥ log
[
−1− s
s
log Φ
(
− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)]
+O(1) (96)
= log
[
−1− s
s
(
−Φ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
))]
+O(log |L|)) (97)
= log
[
Φ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)]
+O(log |L|) (98)
= − L
2
2V (A|E|PAE) +O(log |L|), (99)
where in (96), we used the above observation that Ψ2(s, L) = Ω(Ψ1(s, L)) as L → −∞, in (97), we wrote
Φ(−L/√V ) = 1− Φ(L/√V ) and used the fact that log(1− x) = −x+O(x2) as x ↓ 0, in (98) we used the fact
that log[(1− s)/s] = O(1), and finally in (99) we used the approximation in (83). To show that the upper bound in
(74) matches the lower bound given by (99) (when L→ −∞), we use (90) and steps similar to those in (91)–(95)
to assert that
− 1− s
s
log
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
− L+ x√
V2(A|E|PAE)
) 1
1−s e−x2/(2V1(A|E|PAE))√
2piV1(A|E|PAE)
dx
≤ −1− s
s
log
[
1− 1
1− sΦ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)]
(100)
=
1
s
Φ
(
L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
+O
(
e−L
4/(4V (A|E|PAE)2)
)
, (101)
where in (101), we again used the fact that log(1− x) = −x+O(x2) for x ↓ 0. Now taking the logarithm and the
limit as L→ −∞, we match the lower bound in (99) completing the proof of (81).
VI. ONE-SHOT BOUNDS
To prove Theorems 1, 2 and 3, we leverage the following one-shot (i.e., blocklength n equal to 1) bounds. The
proofs of these one-shot bounds are rather technical and hence we provide them in the appendices.
A. One-Shot Bounds for the Direct Parts
For the direct parts of the equivocation results, we evaluate the following one-shot bounds. The first two bounds
in (102) and (103) can be considered as generalizations of the bounds by Hayashi in [17] where  = 1.
Lemma 1. For an ensemble of -almost universal2 hash functions fX : A → M = {1, . . . ,M}, we have for
s ∈ [0, 1],
esC1+s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX) ≤ s +M se−sH1+s(A|E|PAE), (102)
e
s
1+s
C↑1+s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX) ≤  s1+s +M s1+s e− s1+sH↑1+s(A|E|PAE). (103)
In the other direction with s ∈ [0, 1],
e−sC1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX))
≥ 2−s
∑
(a,e):PA|E(a|e)≥ M
PAE(a, e)PA|E(a|e)−sM−s + 2−s
∑
(a,e):PA|E(a|e)< M
PAE(a, e)
−s, (104)
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX))
≥ 1
2M
s
1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ M
PA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s
+ (2)−
s
1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)< M
PA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
.
(105)
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For the direct parts of the exponents results, we evaluate the following one-shot bound.
Lemma 2. For an ensemble of universal2 hash functions fX : A →M = {1, . . . ,M}, we have for any s ∈ [0, 1],
e
s
1+s
C↑1+s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX) ≤ 1 + 1
1 + s
M se−sH1+s(A|E|PAE). (106)
For the direct parts of the second-order results, we evaluate the following one-shot bound.
Lemma 3. For an ensemble of an -almost universal2 hash functions fX : A → M = {1, . . . ,M}, we have for
any s ∈ [0, 1] and c > 0,
e−sC1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX) ≥ PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≤
c
M
}( 1
c+ 
)s
, (107)
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX) ≥
( 1
c+ 
) s
1−s ∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≤ cM
PA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
. (108)
B. One-Shot Bounds for the Converse Parts
For the converse parts of the equivocation results, we evaluate the following one-shot bounds.
Lemma 4. Fix c > 1 and s ≥ 0. Any hash function f : A →M = {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
e−sC1−s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≤ c−s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM−s
+ 2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≤
c
M
}
. (109)
For the Gallager-type counterpart,
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≤ 2 s1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
[(
c−s
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM−s
) 1
1−s
+
(
2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}) 1
1−s
]
. (110)
For the converse parts of the exponents results and the second-order results for the Re´nyi parameter being 1 + s
(with s nonnegative), we evaluate the following one-shot bounds.
Lemma 5. Fix c > 1 and s ∈ [0, 1]. Any hash function f : A →M = {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
e−sC1−s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≤
∑
(a,e):PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PE(e)PA|E(a|e)1−sM−s +
∑
e
PE(e)PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s
(111)
≤ PA,E
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
c−s + PA,E
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s
. (112)
For the Gallager-type counterpart, for s ∈ [0, 1),
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≤
∑
e
PE(e)
[
PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
c−s
+ PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s] 11−s
. (113)
In the other direction, for s ∈ [0, 1], we have
esC1+s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≥
∑
(a,e):PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PE(e)PA|E(a|e)1+sM s
+
∑
e
PE(e)PA|E=e
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1+s
(114)
≥ PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
cs + PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1+s
. (115)
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For the Gallager-type counterpart, for s ∈ [0, 1], we have
e
s
1+s
C↑1+s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≥
∑
e
PE(e)
[
PA|E=E
{
a : PA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
cs
+ PA|E=E
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1+s] 11+s
. (116)
For the converse parts of the second-order results for the Re´nyi parameter being 1 − s (with s nonnegative),
we need the following one-shot bound as well as (110) and (113) although the converse parts of the second-order
results with Re´nyi parameter being 1 + s require (114) and (116).
Lemma 6. Fix c > 1 and s ∈ [0, 1]. Any hash function f : A →M = {1, . . . ,M} satisfies
e−sC1−s(f(A)|E|PAE) ≤ c−sPAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
+ 2
s
1−s s
s
1−sPAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≤
c
M
}
. (117)
VII. PROOFS OF THE ASYMPTOTIC RESULTS
In this section, we prove the asymptotic results in Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
Notation: Throughout, we let a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ An and e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) ∈ En denote deterministic
length-n strings. We also let An = (A1, A2, . . . , An) and En = (E1, E2, . . . , En) denote random vectors of length
n. We adopt the exponential equality notation: an
.
= bn if and only if limn→∞ 1n log
an
bn
= 0.
Given a random variable X with distribution (probability mass function) P , we denote the expectation of a
function of the random variable g(X) by E[g(X)] =
∑
x P (x)g(x). If we want to make the dependence of the
expectation on X or P explicit, we write EX [g(X)] or EP [g(X)]. The same comment applies to the variance
operator which we denote interchangeably as Var[g(X)], VarX [g(X)] or VarP [g(X)].
A. Proof of Theorem 1
1) Direct Parts: We first prove the direct parts (upper bounds).
a) Proof of the upper bound of (47): The bound in (102) implies that
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn))
≤ 1
s
log
(
s +M sne
−sH1+s(An|En|PnAE)) (118)
=
1
s
log
(
s +M sne
−nsH1+s(A|E|PAE)). (119)
For  being a constant, this achieves the upper bound of (47) upon normalizing by n and taking the lim sup.
b) Proof of the upper bound of (48): The bound in (103) implies that
C↑1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn))
≤ 1 + s
s
log
(

s
1+s +M
s
1+s
n e
− s
1+s
H1+s(An|En|PnAE)) (120)
=
1 + s
s
log
(

s
1+s +M
s
1+s
n e
−n s
1+s
H1+s(A|E|PAE)). (121)
This leads to the upper bound of (48) for constant  upon normalizing by n and taking the lim sup.
c) Proof of the upper bound of (49): To obtain (49), we employ Crame´r’s theorem [48] on the sequence of
random variables − logPnA|E(An|En) =
∑n
i=1− logPA|E(Ai|Ei) under the product joint distribution PnAE . It is
easy to see by using exponential tail bounds that
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log
∑
(a,e):PnA|E(a|e)<e−nR
PnAE(a, e)
= lim
n→∞−
1
n
logPnAE
{
(a, e) :
1
n
n∑
i=1
logPA|E(ai|ei) ≤ −R
}
(122)
= max
t≥0
t(R−H1−t(A|E|PAE)). (123)
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Note that the cumulant generating function of the random variable − logPA|E(A|E) under the joint distribution
PAE can be expressed in terms of the conditional Re´nyi entropy as
logEPAE
[
et(− logPA|E(A|E))
]
= tH1−t(A|E|PAE), (124)
explaining the presence of this term in (123). We again apply (a generalized version of) Cramer’s theorem4 to
the sequence of random variables logPnA|E(A
n|En) under the sub-distribution (non-negative product measure)
PnAE(a, e)(P
−s
A|E)
n(a|e) and event {(a, e) : logPnA|E(a|e) ≥ −nR}. Note that the cumulant generating function in
this case is
τs(t) := log
∑
a,e
PAE(a, e)P
−s
A|E(a|e) exp
(
t logPA|E(a|e)
)
(125)
= (s− t)H1−(s−t)(A|E|PAE), (126)
and by direct differentiation, we also have that
τ ′s(0) = −Rˆ−s (127)
where Rˆs is defined in (24) (cf. Rˆ−s is presented in a different form in (51)). Thus, by Crame´r’s theorem,∑
(a,e):PnA|E(a|e)≥e−nR
PnAE(a, e)P
n
A|E(a|e)−s .=
E[et logPA|E(A|E)]
e−tnR
(128)
= exp
[
−n
(
−tR− log
∑
a,e
PAE(a, e)PA|E(a|e)set logPA|E(A|E)
)]
(129)
= exp
[−n (−tR+ (t− s)H1+(t−s)(A|E|PAE))] , (130)
where in (128), the “expectation” E is taken with respect to the non-negative measure (a, e) 7→ PAE(a, e)PA|E(a|e).
Since t ≥ 0 is arbitrary,
− 1
n
log
∑
(a,e):PnA|E(a|e)≥e−nR
PnAE(a, e)P
n
A|E(a|e)−s
= max
t≥0
{− tR+ (t− s)H1+(t−s)(A|E|PAE)} (131)
For the case where R ≥ Rˆ−s, the constraint in the optimization above is active, i.e., t∗ = 0 because the function
s 7→ Rˆ−s is monotonically non-decreasing as described in Section II-A. Conversely, when R ≤ Rˆ−s, the constraint
is inactive, i.e., the maximum is realized with R = Rˆ−(s−t). Thus, we obtain
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log
∑
(a,e):PnA|E(a|e)≥e−nR
PnAE(a, e)P
n
A|E(a|e)−se−snR
=
{
s(R−H1−s(A|E|PAE)) if R ≥ Rˆ−s
maxt′≤s t′(R−H1−t′(A|E|PAE)) if R ≤ Rˆ−s , (132)
where the second clause follows by the substitution t′ = s − t. Now with these preparations, we can employ the
one-shot bound in (104) with  = 1 to prove the direct part of (49) as follows: Since (132) is not greater than
4The standard Crame´r’s theorem [48, Section 2.2] (or Sanov’s theorem [48, Section 2.1]) is a large-deviations result concerning the
exponent of Pn(B) where P is a probability measure and B is an event in the sample space Ω. If P is not necessarily a probability measure
but a finite non-negative measure (as it is in our applications), say µ, Crame´r’s theorem clearly also applies by defining the new probability
measure B 7→ P˜ (B) := µ(B)/µ(Ω).
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(123), the former dominates in the exponent and we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
= −1
s
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
[
e−sC1−s(fXn (A
n)|EnXn|PnAE×PXn )
]
(133)
≤ −1
s
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
[
2−s
∑
(a,e):PnA|E(a|e)<e−nR
PnAE(a, e)
+ 2−s
∑
(a,e):PnA|E(a|e)≥e−nR
PnAE(a, e)P
n
A|E(a|e)−se−snR
]
, (134)
where (134) follows from (104). Now we combine the asymptotic results in (123) and (132) to evaluate the
asymptotic behavior of (134). In particular, we take into consideration the scaling factor 1s . We also note that the
domain of maximization of t in (123) and t′ in the second clause of (132) are [0,∞) and (∞, s] respectively.
So the intersection of these domains is [0, s] and the eventual max should thus be taken over [0, s]. Uniting these
observations, we obtain that the upper bound
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
C1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
≤
{
R−H1−s(A|E|PAE) if R ≥ Rˆ−s
maxt∈[0,s] ts(R−H1−t(A|E|PAE)) if R ≤ Rˆ−s
. (135)
d) Proof of the upper bound of (50): The upper bound of (50) proceeds in an analogous manner. It proceeds
in five distinct steps, each detailed in the following five paragraphs.
In Step 1, we manipulate the one-shot bound in (105) with  = 1 as follows:
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
= −1− s
s
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
[
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(fXn (A
n)|EnXn|PnAE×PXn )
]
(136)
≤ −1− s
s
lim inf
n→∞ log
[
1
2
e−
s
1−snR
∑
e
PnE(e)
( ∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)≥e−nR
PnA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s
+
1
2
s
1−s
∑
e
PnE(e)
( ∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)<e−nR
PnA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s
]
. (137)
In the following two steps, we evaluate the first and second terms in the lim inf in (137).
In Step 2, we evaluate the second term in the lim inf in (137) as it is simpler and provides the intuition and
techniques for evaluating the first term. For this, we need to employ the Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem [48] (instead of
Cramer’s theorem). Doing so to the sequence of random variables − logPnA|E(An|e) =
∑n
i=1− logPA|E(Ai|ei)
with e of fixed type [14] and An with the memoryless distribution PnA|E(·|e), as will be shown in the following,
we obtain
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log
∑
e
PnE(e)
( ∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)<e−nR
PnA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
= max
t≥0
t
1− s
(
R−H1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)
)
, (138)
where H1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE) is the two-parameter conditional Re´nyi entropy defined in (22). To show (138), consider
e ∈ TQ = {e ∈ En : type(e) = Q}. Then the Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem [48] yields that
PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) < e−nR
}
.
= exp
(
−nmax
t≥0
[
tR− EQ log
∑
a
P 1−tA|E(a|E)
])
, (139)
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where
EQ log
∑
a
P 1−tA|E(a|E) =
∑
e
Q(e) log
∑
a
P 1−tA|E(a|e). (140)
Let Pn(E) be the set of n-types with alphabet E . Splitting the sum on the left-hand-side in (138) into the polynomially
many n-types on E , we obtain∑
e∈En
PnE(e)
( ∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)<e−nR
PnA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
.
=
∑
Q∈Pn(E)
PnE(TQ) exp
(
− n
1− s maxt≥0
[
tR− EQ log
∑
a
P 1−tA|E(a|E)
])
(141)
.
= max
Q∈Pn(E)
exp
(− nD(Q‖PE)) exp(− n
1− s maxt≥0
[
tR− EQ log
∑
a
P 1−tA|E(a|E)
])
(142)
.
= exp
(
−nmin
Q
max
t≥0
[
tR
1− s −
EQ log
∑
a P
1−t
A|E(a|E)
1− s +D(Q‖PE)
])
(143)
= exp
(
−nmax
t≥0
min
Q
[
tR
1− s −
EQ log
∑
a P
1−t
A|E(a|E)
1− s +D(Q‖PE)
])
(144)
where (142) follows from the fact that PnE(TQ) .= exp(−nD(Q‖PE)) [14, Ch. 2], the swapping of min and max
in (144) follows from the fact that the objective function is convex and concave in Q and t respectively, Q resides in
a compact, convex set (the probability simplex) and t resides in a convex set [0,∞) (Sion’s minimax theorem [60]).
Now by straightforward calculus, the optimizing distribution for fixed t is
Q∗(e) =
PE(e)
(∑
a P
1−t
A|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
Zs,t
(145)
where the normalizing constant (partition function)
Zs,t :=
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
P 1−tA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
. (146)
Plugging this into (144) we obtain∑
e∈En
PnE(e)
( ∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)<e−nR
PnA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s .
= exp
(
−nmax
t≥0
t
1− s
[
R− 1− s
t
Zs,t
])
(147)
which then yields (138). Note that we have to use the Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem (and not Cramer’s theorem) because
the collection of random variables {− logPA|E(Ai|ei) : i = 1, . . . , n} is independent but not identically distributed.
In Step 3, we evaluate the first term in the lim inf in (137) again by applying the Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem [48] to the
sequence of random variables logPnA|E(A
n|e) = ∑ni=1 logPA|E(Ai|ei) with non-negative measure PnA|E(·|e)1−s,
we have ∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)≥e−nR
PnA|E(a|e)1−s .= exp
(
−nmax
t≥0
[
− tR− EQ log
∑
a
P
1−(s−t)
A|E (a|E)
])
(148)
where Q is the type of e and EQ log
∑
a P
1−(s−t)
A|E (a|E) is defined in (140). So by using a type partitioning argument
of sequences e similarly to (141)–(147), we obtain∑
e
PnE(e)
( ∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)≥e−nR
PnA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s
.
= exp
(
−nmax
t≥0
[
− tR
1− s + log
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
P
1−(s−t)
A|E (a|e)
) 1
1−s
])
. (149)
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Consequently, considering the two different cases similarly to (132), we obtain
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log
e− s1−snR∑
e
PnE(e)
( ∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)≥e−nR
PnA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s

=
{
s
1−s(R−H↑1−s(A|E|PAE)) if R ≥ ddt tH1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
maxt∈[0,s] t1−s(R−H1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)) if R ≤ ddt tH1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
. (150)
In Step 4, we put together the asymptotic evaluations in (138) and (150) in the bound in (137). We observe
that (138) is not smaller than (150). Thus, the former dominates the exponential behavior, and plugging (138) into
(137), we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
C↑1−s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
≤
{
R−H↑1−s(A|E|PAE) if R ≥ ddt tH1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
maxt∈[0,s] ts(R−H1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)) if R ≤ ddt tH1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
. (151)
Finally in Step 5, we show that the transition rate in (151)
d
dt
tH1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
= Rˆ↑−s (152)
as follows. Since maxtH1−s|1−t(A|E|PAE) = H1−s|1−s(A|E|PAE) (i.e., the maximum is attained at t = s),
d
dt
sH1−s|1−t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
= s
d
dt
H1−s|1−t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
= 0. (153)
Hence, choosing t1 = t2 = t, we have
Rˆ↑−s =
d
dt
tH↑1−t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
(154)
=
d
dt
tH1−t|1−t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
(155)
=
dt1
dt
∂
∂t1
t1H1−t1|1−t2(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
+
dt2
dt
∂
∂t2
t1H1−t1|1−t2(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
(156)
=
d
dt
tH1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
+
d
dt
sH1−s|1−t(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
(157)
=
d
dt
tH1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)
∣∣
t=s
, (158)
where (155) follows from the relation in (52), (156) follows from the chain rule, and (158) follows from (153).
The relations in (151) and (152) complete the justification of the upper bound of (50).
2) Converse Parts: For the converse, we do not consider the common randomness Xn (i.e., Xn = ∅) since the
bound must hold for all (not just -almost universal2) hash functions fXn . This statement applies to the proofs of
all converse bounds in the sequel.
a) Proofs of the lower bounds of (47) and (48): The lower bounds to (47) and (48) can be easily obtained
by using the data processing inequalities for Re´nyi conditional entropies and their Gallager-type counterparts in
(26)–(28).
b) Proof of the lower bound of (49): Now for (49), we note that when R ≥ Rˆ−s, we have
s(R−H1−s(A|E|PAE)) ≤ max
t∈[0,s]
t(R−H1−t(A|E|PAE)) (159)
and when R ≤ Rˆ−s, equality holds since t = s attains the maximum. Fix t ∈ [0, s]. From (109), we obtain the
bound
e−sC1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) ≤ c−s
∑
e
PEn(e)
∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)≥ cMn
PnA|E(a|e)1−sM−sn
+ 2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) <
c
Mn
}
(160)
≤ c−sesH1−s(An|En|PnAE)M−sn + 2
s
1−s s
1
1−s−1(1− s)etH1−t(An|En|PnAE)
(Mn
c
)−t
, (161)
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where in (161), we upper bounded the probability in the second term using Markov’s inequality, i.e., for any
t ∈ [0, s],
PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) <
c
Mn
}
= PnAE
{
(a, e) : e−t logP
n
A|E(a|e) > e−t log
c
Mn
}
(162)
≤
EPnAE
[
e−t logP
n
A|E(A
n|En)
]
e−t log
c
Mn
(163)
= etH1−t(A
n|En|PnAE)
(Mn
c
)−t
. (164)
Put c = 1 in (161). We then obtain the lower bound to (49) by applying (159) and its equality version for R ≤ Rˆ−s.
c) Proof of the lower bound of (50): Finally, (50) can be obtained by evaluating (110) as follows:
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≤ 2 s1−s
∑
e
[
PEn(e)
(
c−s
∑
a:PnA|E(a|e)≥ cMn
PnA|E(a|e)1−sM−sn
) 1
1−s
+
(
2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) <
c
Mn
}) 1
1−s
]
(165)
≤ 2 s1−s
[
c−se
s
1−sH
↑
1−s(A
n|En|PnAE)M
− s
1−s
n
+ 2
s
(1−s)2 s
s
(1−s)2 (1− s) 11−s
∑
e
PnE(e)e
t
1−sH1−t(A
n|PAn|En=e)
(Mn
c
)− t
1−s
]
(166)
= 2
s
1−s
[
c−se
s
1−sH
↑
1−s(A
n|En|PnAE)M
− s
1−s
n + 2
s
(1−s)2 s
s
(1−s)2 (1− s) 11−s e t1−sH1−t|1−s(An|En|PnAE)
(Mn
c
)− t
1−s
]
(167)
with s ≥ t ≥ 0. For brevity, let βs := 2
s
(1−s)2 s
s
(1−s)2 (1− s) 11−s be a function that only depends on s. By taking the
logarithm of (167), normalizing by n, and using Mn = enR, we obtain
1
n
C↑1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≥ −1− s
sn
log
[
2
s
1−s
[
c−se
s
1−sH
↑
1−s(A
n|En|PnAE)M
− s
1−s
n + βse
t
1−sH1−t|1−s(A
n|En|PnAE)
(Mn
c
)− t
1−s
]]
(168)
= −1− s
sn
log
[
2
s
1−s
[
c−se−n
s
1−s (R−H↑1−s(A|E|PAE)) + βsc
t
1−s e−n
t
1−s (R−H1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE))
]]
. (169)
Now similarly to (159), we have
s(R−H↑1−s(A|E|PAE)) ≤ max
t∈[0,s]
t(R−H1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)). (170)
Thus when R ≥ Rˆ↑−s, the first term in (169) dominates (exponent is not larger), resulting in the first clause
in (50), namely R−H↑1−s(A|E|PAE). On the other hand, when R ≤ Rˆ↑−s, the second term in (169) dominates. To
complete the argument, we optimize over t ∈ [0, s] to obtain the second clause in (50), namely maxt∈[0,s] ts(R −
H1−t|1−s(A|E|PAE)). This completes the proof of the lower bound of (50).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
1) Direct Parts:
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a) Proof of the lower bound of (55): We note, per the discussion following Theorem 2, that
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)) = O(n), and (171)
C↑1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)) = O(n). (172)
Thus, the exponents are lower bounded by zero, explaining the | · |+ in (55) and (57).
Now for the non-trivial (non-zero) lower bound on the exponents, we employ (102) with  = 1 and t ∈ [s, 1].
We recall that Mn = enR. Now we have
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn))
≤ C1+t(fXn(An)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)) (173)
≤ 1
t
log
(
1 +M tne
−tH1+t(An|En|PnAE)
)
(174)
≤ 1
t
M tne
−ntH1+t(A|E|PAE). (175)
Taking the logarithm and optimizing over t ∈ [s, 1], we obtain the lower bound to (55).
b) Proof of the lower bound of (57): Similarly, applying (106) to the case t ∈ [s, 1], we obtain
C↑1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn))
≤ C↑1+t(fXn(An)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)) (176)
≤ 1 + t
t
log
(
1 +
1
1 + t
M tne
−tH1+t(An|En|PnAE)
)
(177)
≤ 1
t
M tne
−ntH1+t(A|E|PAE) (178)
which implies the lower bound to (57) upon optimizing over t ∈ [s, 1].
c) Proofs of the lower bounds of (56) and (58): For the −s versions in (56) and (58), we simply note that
C1+s ≥ C1−s′ (179)
C↑1+s ≥ C↑1−s′ (180)
for any s, s′ ∈ [0, 1] because as mentioned in Section II-A (after (15) and (20) respectively), H1+s and H†1+s are
monotonically decreasing in s. Thus, we have
lim inf
n→∞ −
1
n
logC1−s′(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn))≥ lim infn→∞ −
1
n
logC1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)) (181)
lim inf
n→∞ −
1
n
logC↑1−s′(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn))≥ lim infn→∞ −
1
n
logC↑1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)). (182)
Combining these statements with the bounds derived in (173)–(178) completes the proof of (56) and (58).
2) Converse Parts:
a) Proof of the upper bound of (55): For the converse, we first show the upper bound to (55). Choose a
constant c0 satisfying cs0 > 1 + s. Recall the definition of Rˆs in (24). Now assume that R ≥ Rˆs. We claim that
lim
n→∞−
1
n
log
[
PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆs
}
cs0e
−snRˆsesnR
]
= sH1+s(A|E|PAE)− sR. (183)
This is justified as follows. We know from Crame´r’s theorem [48] that
PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆs
}
.
= exp
(
−nmax
t≥0
{
tH1+t(A|E|PAE)− tRˆs
})
. (184)
The maximum appeared in right-hand-side of (184) is attained when the derivative of tH1+t(A|E|PAE) − tRˆs is
zero because tH1+t(A|E|PAE) is concave in t. Hence, the real number t satisfies
d
dt
tH1+t(A|E|PAE) = Rˆs, (185)
27
which implies t = s ≥ 0 due to the definition of Rˆs in (24) and the strictly decreasing nature of Rˆs. As a result,
PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆs
}
.
= exp
(
−n
{
sH1+s(A|E|PAE)− sRˆs
})
. (186)
Plugging this into the left-hand-side of (183) yields the claim. The one-shot bound in (115) with c = c0e−nRˆs+nR >
1 implies that
esC1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≥ PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆs
}
cs0e
−nRˆsesnR
+ 1− (1 + s)PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆs
}
(187)
= 1 +
(
cs0e
−snRˆsesnR − 1− s
)
PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆs
}
. (188)
Hence, taking the logarithm of (188), employing the lower bound log(1 + b) ≥ b− b22 , the large-deviations result
(184), and the fact that limn→∞ 1n log(c
s
0e
−snRˆs+snR − 1− s) = s(−Rˆs +R), we obtain
sC1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
.≥ exp [−ns(H1+s(A|E|PAE)−R)] . (189)
Finally, we obtain the upper bound to (55) by taking another logarithm and normalizing by n.
For the other case R ≤ Rˆs, we claim that
max
t≥s
{tH1+t(A|E|PAE)− tR} = max
t≥0
{tH1+t(A|E|PAE)− tR}. (190)
This is because by the strict concavity of t 7→ tH1+t, the map s 7→ Rˆs is strictly decreasing. So for R ≤ Rˆs the
maximum on the right-hand-side of (190) is attained at some t ≥ s. This is also reflected in Fig. 5. Thus, (112)
implies that
esC1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≥ PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nR
}
cs0
+
(
1− PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nsR
})1+s
(191)
≥ 1 + (cs0 − 1− s)PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nsR
}
. (192)
Hence,
C1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
=
1
s
log(esC1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)) (193)
≥ 1
s
log
(
1 + (cs0 − 1− s)PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nsR
})
(194)
.
=
cs0 − 1− s
s
PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nsR
}
. (195)
By combining the asymptotic evaluation using Crame´r’s theorem in (184) and the equality in (190), we see that
for R ≤ Rˆs, we also obtain the upper bound to (55). This completes the proof.
b) Proof of the upper bound of (57): The proof of the upper bound to (57) is similar and we present the
details here. Similarly to the above proof, choose c = c0e−nRˆ
↑
s+nR > 1 and the constant cs0 > 1 + s. Assume that
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R ≥ Rˆ↑s , where Rˆ↑s is defined in (25). Then the one-shot bound in (116) implies that
e
s
1+s
C↑1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≥
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
}
cs0e
−snRˆ↑sesnR
+
(
1− PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
})1+s ) 1
1+s (196)
≥
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
}
cs0e
−snRˆ↑sesnR
+ 1− (1 + s)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
}) 1
1+s (197)
=
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
1 +
(
cs0e
−snRˆ↑sesnR − (1 + s))PAn|En=e {a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ↑s}) 11+s (198)
.
=
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
1 +
cs0e
−snRˆ↑sesnR − (1 + s)
1 + s
PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
})
(199)
= 1 +
cs0e
−snRˆ↑sesnR − (1 + s)
1 + s
∑
e
PnE(e)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
}
, (200)
where (199) follows from the fact that log[(1 + a)t] = t[a+O(a2)] for a ↓ 0. Hence,
C↑1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
=
1 + s
s
log
(
e
s
1+s
C↑1+s(f(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE×PXn )
)
(201)
≥ 1 + s
s
log
(
1 +
cs0e
−snRˆ↑sesnR − (1 + s)
1 + s
∑
e
PnE(e)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
})
(202)
.
=
cs0e
−snRˆ↑sesnR − (1 + s)
s
∑
e
PnE(e)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
}
, (203)
=
cs0e
−snRˆ↑sesnR − (1 + s)
s
PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ c0e−nRˆ
↑
s
}
, (204)
where (204) follows from log(1 + a) = a+O(a2) as a ↓ 0 and the fact that the summation in (202) vanishes as n
grows. Combining (183) and (204) yields the upper bound to (57) for R ≥ Rˆ↑s . A similar calculation for the case
R ≤ Rˆ↑s also yields the the same upper bound to (57).
c) Proof of the upper bound of (56): We choose the constant c such that (1− s) > c−s. We apply Cramer’s
Theorem [48] to the sequence of random variables logPnA|E(A
n|En). Then,
lim
n→∞−
1
n
logPnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
enR
}
= max
t≥0
{tH1+t(A|E|PAE)− tR} . (205)
The one-shot bound in (112) implies that
e−sC1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≤ PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
c−s + PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s
(206)
= PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
c−s +
(
1− PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
})1−s
(207)
≤ 1− ((1− s)− c−s)PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
. (208)
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Thus,
C1−s(f(An)|En|PnAE)
= −1
s
log
[
e−sC1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
]
(209)
≥ −1
s
log
[
1− ((1− s)− c−s)PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}]
(210)
≥ 1
s
((1− s)− c−s)PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
, (211)
where the final step uses the inequality log(1− t) ≤ −t. Combining the limiting statement in (205) and the bound
in (211), we have the upper bound to (56).
d) Proof of the upper bound of (58): When
∑
e P
n
E(e)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥ cM
}
is exponentially small,
(113) implies that
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≤
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
c−s
+ PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s) 11−s
(212)
=
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
c−sPAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
+
(
1− PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
})1−s) 11−s
(213)
≤
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
1− (1− s− c−s)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}) 1
1−s (214)
.
=
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
1− 1− s− c
−s
1− s PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
})
(215)
= 1− 1− s− c
−s
1− s
∑
e
PnE(e)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
, (216)
where (215) follows from the same reasoning as (199). Thus,
C↑1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) = −
1− s
s
log
[
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
]
(217)
≥ −1− s
s
log
[
1− 1− s− c
−s
1− s
∑
e
PnE(e)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}]
(218)
≥ 1− s
s
· 1− s− c
−s
1− s
∑
e
PnE(e)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
(219)
=
1− s− c−s
s
∑
e
PnE(e)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
. (220)
Combining (205) and (220), we have the upper bound to (58).
C. Proof of Theorem 3
1) Direct Parts:
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a) Proof of upper bounds for Case (A): First, we prove the upper bounds for Case (A) where the Re´nyi
parameter α = 1 + s for s ∈ (0, 1]. Substituting enH1+s(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL into Mn in the chain of inequalities in
(118)–(119), we obtain, for the class of -almost universal2 hash functions fXn , that
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) ≤
1
s
log
(
s + es
√
nL
)
. (221)
Set  to be a constant (not varying with n). Normalizing by
√
n and taking the lim sup as n→∞ yields the upper
bound to (68).
In an exactly analogous way, the upper bound to (69) can be shown by substituting enH
↑
1+s(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL into
Mn in the chain of inequalities in (176)–(178).
Substituting enH1+s(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL into Mn in the chain of inequalities in (173)–(175) with t = s, we obtain
C1+s(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) ≤M sne−snH1+s(A|E|PAE) = es
√
nL (222)
which implies the upper bound to (70) after we take the logarithm, normalize both sides by
√
n and take the lim sup
as n→∞.
In an exactly analogous way, the upper bound to (71) can be shown by substituting enH
↑
1+s(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL into Mn
in the chain of inequalities in (120)–(121). This completes the proof for the direct part of Case (A) of Theorem 3.
b) Proof of upper bound for Case (B): Case (B) follows from four distinct steps, detailed in each of the
following paragraphs.
In Step 1, we fix any function f : An → {1, . . . , ‖f‖}. We partition the space An × En into pairs of sequences
of the same joint type [14]. Let QAE denote a generic joint type on A×E . Let U (QAE) be the uniform distribution
over the type class TQAE ⊂ An × En. Let
U
(QAE)
f(An),En(i, e) :=
∑
a:f(a)=i
U (QAE)(a, e) (223)
be the distribution on {1, . . . , ‖f‖} × En when the hash function f is applied to the variable An and denote
U
(QAE)
En (e) :=
‖f‖∑
i=1
U
(QAE)
f(An),En(i, e) (224)
as its En-marginal. Because the probability of pairs of sequences of the same joint type have the same PnAE-
probability, we can write
Pf(An),En(i, e) =
∑
QAE∈Pn(A×E)
PnAE(TQAE)U (QAE)f(An),En(i, e). (225)
By using (225), we have
C1(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) = D(Pf(An),En‖Pmix,f(An) × PEn) (226)
≤
∑
QAE∈Pn(A×E)
PnAE(TQAE)D
(
U
(QAE)
f(An),En
∥∥∥Pmix,f(An) × U (QAE)En ) (227)
=
∑
QAE∈Pn(A×E)
PnAE(TQAE)C1
(
f(An)|En
∣∣∣U (QAE)AnEn ) (228)
≤
∑
QAE∈Pn(A×E)
PnAE(TQAE)C2
(
f(An)|En
∣∣∣U (QAE)AnEn ) . (229)
where (227) follows from the fact that relative entropy is convex, (228) follows from the definition of C1, and
(229) follows from the fact that s 7→ C1+s is monotonically non-decreasing.
In Step 2, we regard f as a universal2 hash function fXn . Thus, (229) implies that
C1(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) = EXn [C1(fXn(An)|En|PnAE)] (230)
≤
∑
QAE∈Pn(A×E)
PnAE(TQAE)EXn
[
C2
(
fXn(A
n)|En
∣∣∣U (QAE)AnEn )] . (231)
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Let TQA|E(e) := {a : (a, e) ∈ TQAE} be the conditional type class of QA|E given e, also known as the QA|E-shell.
By the method of types [14, Ch. 2], we know that for e of type QE ,
log
∣∣TQA|E(e)∣∣ = nH(A|E|QAE) +O(log n). (232)
By using the fact that e−H2(A|E) is the conditional collision probability (i.e., e−H2(A|E) =
∑
e PE(e)PAA′|E=e{(a, a′) :
a = a′} where A,A′ are conditionally independent and identically distributed given E),
e−H2(A|E|U
(QAE)) =
∑
e
U
(QAE)
En (e)
∑
a∈TQA|E (e)
1
|TQA|E(e)|2
(233)
=
∑
e
U
(QAE)
En (e)
1
|TQA|E(e)|
(234)
= e−nH(A|E|QAE)+O(logn). (235)
Furthermore, by a Taylor expansion of H(A|E|QAE) around PAE as in the rate redundancy lemma [51], [61], we
have
H(A|E|QAE) = H(A|E|PAE) +
∑
a,e
(QAE(a, e)− PAE(a, e))hA|E(a|e) +O
(‖QAE − PAE‖2) (236)
where the conditional entropy density hA|E(a|e) is defined as
hA|E(a|e) := log
1
PA|E(a|e)
(237)
and ‖Q − P‖ = ∑z∈Z |Q(z) − P (z)| is the variational distance between Q and P . For brevity, we denote the√
n-scaled version of the second term in (236) as
bn(QAE) :=
√
n
(∑
a,e
(QAE(a, e)− PAE(a, e))hA|E(a, e)
)
. (238)
If QAE is a random type formed from n independent copies of PAE ,
bn(QAE) =
√
n
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
hA|E(Ai|Ei)−H(A|E|PAE)
)
d−→ N (0, V (A|E|PAE)) (239)
by the central limit theorem. That is, bn(QAE) converges in distribution to the Gaussian N (0, V (A|E|PAE)).
In Step 3, we first fix δ > 0. Applying the universal2 property of the universal2 hash function fXn to the collision
relative entropy (see (118)–(119) with  = s = 1), and combining the above notations and bounds, we obtain for
all e ∈ TQE and all n large enough (depending on δ) that
EXn
[
C2
(
fXn(A
n)|En
∣∣∣U (QAE)AnEn )]
= EXn
[
logM −H2
(
fXn(A
n)|En
∣∣∣U (QAE)AnEn )] (240)
≤ log
(
1 +Mne
−nH(A|E|QAE)+O(logn)
)
(241)
≤ log (1 + exp [√n(L− bn(QAE) + o(bn(QAE)) +O(log n)]) (242)
≤
{ √
n
(
L− bn(QAE) + o(bn(QAE))
)
+O(log n) bn(QAE) ≤ L+ δ
e−δ
√
n/2 bn(QAE) > L+ δ
, (243)
where (240) follows from the definition of C2 and (241) uses the bound in (235). Also note that we used the fact
that ‖f‖ = Mn = enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL in (242).
Finally in Step 4, by plugging (243) back into (231), we obtain that for all n large enough (depending on δ),
C1(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn)
≤
∑
QAE∈Pn(A×E):bn(QAE)≤L+δ
PnAE(TQAE)
(
L− (1− δ)bn(QAE)
)
+O
(
log n√
n
)
. (244)
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Let V := V (A|E|PAE). By the central limit-type convergence in (239), we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
1√
n
C1(fXn(A
n)|EnXn|PnAE × PXn) ≤
∫ L+δ
−∞
L− (1− δ)b√
2piV
e−b
2/(2V ) db. (245)
By a change of variables to x := b/
√
V and taking δ ↓ 0, we immediately obtain the direct part (upper bound) of
Case (B) in (72).
c) Proof of upper bounds for Case (C): For Case (C), the upper bound to (73) can be obtained by specializing
the one-shot bound in (107) with  = 1, Mn = enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL and c = e−n1/4 . With these choices, we have
e−sC1−s(fXn (A
n)|EnXn|PnAE×PXn )
≥ PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≤
e−n1/4
enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL
}( 1
1 + e−n1/4
)s
(246)
= PnAE
{
(a, e) :
1√
n
n∑
i=1
[− logPA|E(ai|ei)−H(A|E|PAE)] ≥ L+ 1√n
}( 1
1 + e−n1/4
)s
. (247)
The probability is an information spectrum [47] term with n independent and identically distributed random variables
and since PAiEi = PAE for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
EPAiEi
[− logPA|E(Ai|Ei)] = H(A|E|PAE), (248)
VarPAiEi
[− logPA|E(Ai|Ei)] = V (A|E|PAE). (249)
So by the central limit theorem, the right-hand-side of (247) converges uniformly as follows:
lim
n→∞P
n
AE
{
(a, e) :
1√
n
n∑
i=1
[− logPA|E(ai|ei)−H(A|E|PAE)] ≥ L+ 1√n
}
= Φ
(
− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
. (250)
Plugging (250) into (247), taking the logarithm, and normalizing by −s yields the upper bound to (73).
In a similar way, the upper bound to (74) can be obtained by specializing the one-shot bound in (108) with
 = 1, Mn = enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL and c = e−n1/4 . The calculation for the specialization is similar to the converse
part which is detailed in full in (280)–(283) in the next section. This completes the proof for the direct part of Case
(C) of Theorem 3.
2) Converse Parts:
a) Proof of lower bounds for Case (A): We now prove the lower bounds for Case (A). The first two bounds
can be shown using the data processing inequalities in (26)–(28). In particular, the lower bound to (68) can be
evaluated as follows:
C1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) = nH1+s(A|E|PAE) +
√
nL−H1+s(f(An)|En|PnAE) (251)
≥ nH1+s(A|E|PAE) +
√
nL−H1+s(An|En|PnAE) (252)
= nH1+s(A|E|PAE) +
√
nL− nH1+s(A|E|PAE) (253)
=
√
nL, (254)
where (252) follows from (27). The lower bound to (69) follows completely analogously using (28).
The lower bound to (70) can be shown by first relaxing (114) as follows:
esC1+s(f(A)|E|PAE)
≥
∑
(a,e):PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PE(e)PA|E(a|e)1+sM s +
∑
e
PE(e)PA|E=e
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1+s
(255)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)PA|E=e
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1+s
(256)
≥ PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1+s
(257)
=
[
1− PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}]1+s
(258)
≥ 1− (1 + s)PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
(259)
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where (257) uses Jensen’s inequality (for the convex function t 7→ t1+s) and (259) uses the inequality (1−x)1+s ≥
1− (1 + s)x (also due to the convexity of t 7→ t1+s). Hence we have for the n-shot setting
sC1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) ≥ log
(
1− (1 + s)PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
Mn
})
. (260)
Applying the modified Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem derived in Hayashi-Tan [62, Appendix A] to the sequence of random
variables − logPnA|E(An|En) with Mn = enH1+s(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL and c = 1, we have
lim
n→∞
1√
n
logPnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≥
c
Mn
}
= −sL. (261)
The modification here is due to the different normalization of
√
n as opposed to the normalization by n in the
usual Ga¨rtner-Ellis theorem in [48]. Also see Remark (a) to Theorem 2.3.6 in [48]. Combining (261) with (260)
yields the lower bound to (70). The lower bound to (71) can be proved in a completely analogous way by relaxing
the one-shot bound in (116).
b) Proof of lower bound for Case (B): For the converse part of Case (B), we use Theorem 8 of [16], which
analyzes the second-order asymptotics of intrinsic randomness [47, Ch. 2] [63]. Define the second-order coding
rate at length n as
Ln :=
1√
n
(
logMn − nH(A|E|PAE)
)
(262)
and the distribution function F (e)n which is dependent on e as
F (e)n (x) := PAn|En=e
{
a : − 1
n
logPAn|En=e(a) ≤ H(A|E|PAE) +
x√
n
}
. (263)
Now, from the proof of Theorem 8 of [16] (second column page 4634), we deduce that for each e ∈ En,
H(f(An)|PAn|En=e)
≤ √n
∫ Ln
−∞
adF (e)n (a) + nH(A|E|PAE)
+ PAn|En=e
{
a : PAn|En=e(a) ≤
1
Mn
}(√
nLn − logPAn|En=e
{
a : PAn|En=e(a) ≤
1
Mn
})
. (264)
Now note that F (e)n (x) depends only on e through its type. Our next step is to take the expectation of (264) over
e with distribution PnE . Let
g(e) := PAn|En=e
{
a : PAn|En=e(a) ≤
1
Mn
}
. (265)
Since t 7→ −t log t is concave, by Jensen’s inequality, we have
EPEn [g(En)(γ − log g(En))] ≤ EPEn [γg(En)]− EPEn [g(En)] logEPEn [g(En)]. (266)
Now define the averaged distribution function as
Fn(x) :=
∑
e
PnE(e)F
(e)
n (x) = P
n
AE
{
(a, e) : − 1
n
logPnA|E(a|e) ≤ H(A|E|PAE) +
x√
n
}
. (267)
Let γ :=
√
nLn. From (266) and the definition of Fn(x),
H(f(An)|En|PnAE)
≤ √n
∫ Ln
−∞
a dFn(a) + nH(A|E|PAE)
+ PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≤
1
Mn
}(√
nLn − logPnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≤
1
Mn
})
. (268)
34
Thus, by invoking the definition of Ln in (262) and Fn in (267), we obtain the inequality
1√
n
(H(f(An)|En|PnAE)− nH(A|E|PAE))
≤
∫ Ln
−∞
a dFn(a) + P
n
AE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≤
1
Mn
}Ln − logPnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≤ 1Mn
}
√
n
 (269)
=
∫ Ln
−∞
a dFn(a) + (1− Fn(Ln))
(
Ln − log(1− Fn(Ln))√
n
)
. (270)
By the central limit theorem
Fn(x)→ F (x) =
∫ x
−∞
1√
2piV
e−y
2/(2V ) dy, ∀x ∈ R. (271)
Taking the lim sup of (270), and using the central limit result in (271), we obtain
lim sup
n→∞
1√
n
(H(f(An)|En|PnAE)− nH(A|E|PAE)) ≤
∫ L
−∞
adF (a) + L(1− F (L)). (272)
Since, we have the simple relation
C1(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) = D(Pf(An),En‖Pmix,f(An) × PEn) (273)
= −H(f(An)|En|PnAE) + logMn (274)
= −H(f(An)|En|PnAE) + nH(A|E|PAE) +
√
nL, (275)
we immediately obtain the desired lower bound for the second-order asymptotics of C1:
lim inf
n→∞
1√
n
C1(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) ≥
∫ L
−∞
(L− a) dF (a) =
∫ L/√V
−∞
L−√V x√
2pi
e−x
2/2 dx. (276)
c) Proof of lower bounds for Case (C): For Case (C), the first part of the maximum in the lower bound in
(73), namely Γ1(s, L) in (64), follows from (117) and the second part of the maximum, namely Γ2(s, L) in (65),
follows from (112) with the common choice of c = en
1/4
. In particular, specializing the bound in one-shot bound
in (112) with this choice of c, we obtain
e−sC1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) ≤ (en1/4)−s + PnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≤
en
1/4
enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL
}1−s
(277)
where we trivially upper bounded the first probability in the one-shot bound by 1. The first term in (277) goes to
zero (since s > 0) while the second term is an information spectrum term that asymptotically behaves as
lim
n→∞P
n
AE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≤
en
1/4
enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL
}
= Φ
(
− L√
V (A|E|PAE)
)
(278)
by the central limit theorem and the statistics computed in (248)–(249). Hence, taking the logarithm in (277), and
normalizing by −s, we obtain the second term in the maximum in the lower bound in (73), namely Γ2(s, L). In
exactly the same way, specializing the bound in (117), we obtain
e−sC1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE) ≤ (en1/4)−s + 2 s1−s s s1−sPnAE
{
(a, e) : PnA|E(a|e) ≤
en
1/4
enH(A|E|PAE)+
√
nL
}
. (279)
Applying the central limit theorem to the probability in the second term recovers Γ1(s, L) in the lower bound
in (73).
The method to obtain the two terms in the maximum in the lower bound in (74) is more complicated than
that for (73) because we need to condition on various sequences e ∈ En. In particular, to obtain the lower bound
Ψ1(s, L) in (66), we evaluate (110) with c = en
1/4
. We obtain
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≤ 2 s1−s
[
(en
1/4
)−
s
1−s +
∑
e
PnE(e)
(
2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)PAn|En=e
{
a : PnA|E(a|e) <
c
Mn
}) 1
1−s
]
. (280)
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As usual, the first term goes to zero. To compute the probability in the second term, let us denote the type (empirical
distribution) [14] of e by Qe ∈ Pn(E) for the moment. Then we have∣∣∣∣∣PAn|En=e{a : PnA|E(a|e) < cMn
}
− Φ
(
− L+H(A|E|PAE)−H(A|E|PAE‖Qe)√
V2(A|E|PAE‖Qe)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
1√
n
)
(281)
by the Berry-Esseen theorem [64, Sec. XVI.7], where the conditional entropy given another distribution Qe, denoted
as H(A|E|PAE‖Qe), was defined in (12), and conditional varentropy given another distribution Qe is defined as
V2(A|E|PAE‖Qe) :=
∑
e
Qe(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
[
log
1
PA|E(a|e)
−H(A|PA|E=e)
]2
. (282)
Note that V2(A|E|PAE‖PE) = V2(A|E|PAE) defined in (62). In (281), the remainder term O( 1√n) is uniform in
L and Qe. We now plug this into (280) and notice that we are then averaging over all types Qe (where En has
distribution PnE). Now, employing a weak (expectation) form of the Berry-Esseen theorem [65, Thm. 2.2.14] with
x = H(A|E|PAE)−H(A|E|PAE‖Qe) yields
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE)
≤ 2 s1−s
[
O
(
n
− s
4(1−s)
)
+
(
2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)
) 1
1−s
×
∫ ∞
−∞
[
Φ
(
− L+ x√
V2(A|E|PAE)
)
+O
( 1√
n
)] 1
1−s e−x
2/(2V1(A|E|PAE))√
2piV1(A|E|PAE)
dx
]
+O
( 1√
n
)
. (283)
Now we take the logarithm, divide both sides by − s1−s , and take the limit as n → ∞. This yields the lower
bound Ψ1(s, L) in (66). Note that here unlike in the steps leading to (100), we cannot add V1 and V2 due the
exponentiation of the first term by 11−s in the integral.
Using similar techniques, we can obtain the lower bound Ψ2(s, L) defined in (67) from (113). In particular,
evaluate (113) with the same choice of c. Here, in fact, no averaging over En is needed because the first term
in (113) vanishes by our choice of c = en
1/4
. Thus, we obtain the lower bound in (74).
This completes the proof of the converse parts of Theorem 3.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Summary
We have derived the fundamental limits of the asymptotic behavior of the equivocation when a hash function
f is applied to the source (Theorem 1). We have also showed that optimal key generation rates change when
we use alternative Re´nyi information measures (Corollary 1). Under these Re´nyi quantities, we have evaluated the
corresponding exponential rates of decay of the security measures (Theorem 2) as well as their second-order coding
rates (Theorems 3 and 4). The Re´nyi information measures generalize the ubiquitous Shannon information measures
and may be useful in many settings as described in the Introduction. To establish our asymptotic theorems, we have
introduced new families of non-asymptotic achievability and converse bounds on the Re´nyi information measures
and their Gallager counterparts and used various probabilistic limit theorems (such as large deviation theorems and
the central limit theorem) to evaluate these bounds when the number of realizations of the joint source tends to
infinity.
B. Future Research Directions
In the future, we plan to explore various extensions to the results contained herein.
1) We would like to study security problems such as the remaining or residual uncertainty of a source An when
another party observes a compressed version f(An) ∈M := {1, . . . ,Mn} and another correlated source En.
Namely, we aim to study the asymptotic behavior of the conditional Re´nyi entropy H1+s(An|f(An), En|PnAE)
and its Gallager counterpart H↑1+s(A
n|f(An), En|PnAE).
2) Another set of related problems involve the analyses of the asymptotic behavior of H1+s(f(An)|En|PnAE)
and H↑1+s(f(A
n)|En|PnAE). These represent the uncertainties of an eavesdropper with regard to the message
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index f(An) ∈ M. The eavesdropper, however, is equipped with correlated observations En. We anticipate
that some of the techniques developed in the current paper may be useful to perform various calculations.
3) We focused primarily on analyzing C1+s and C
↑
1+s for s ∈ [−1, 1]. It may be of interest to study the various
asymptotic behaviors of C1+s and C
↑
1+s for general s ∈ R since for example, Hmin = lims→∞H1+s and
Hmin [6]–[9] is a fundamental quantity in cryptography and information-theoretic security as mentioned in
Section I-A. Indeed, e−Hmin(A|E|PAE) is the best (highest) probability of successfully guessing A given E. As
remarked after Theorems 1 and 3, we already have the converse parts for all s ≥ 0 for the results in (47),
(48), (68) and (69). They follow immediately from various information processing inequalities. It would be
ideal, though challenging, to complete the story.
4) Lastly, we aim to apply the results and techniques derived herein to information-theoretic security problems
such as the wiretap channel [12] and secret key agreement [19] as was done by various researchers in [17],
[18], [20], [21].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
A. Proof of (102)
Proof: The derivation here is similar to that in [17], [22] for universal2 hash functions. Throughout, for any
function f : A →M, we let
f−1(i) := {a ∈ A : f(a) = i}, ∀ i ∈M. (284)
Now, for any a, due to the -almost universal2 property of fX , we have
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e) ≤ PA|E(a|e) +

M
∑
a′ 6=a
PA|E(a′|e) (285)
≤ PA|E(a|e) +

M
. (286)
Starting from the definition of the conditional Re´nyi divergence, we have
e−sH1+s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX)
= EX
∑
e
PE(e)
M∑
i=1
( ∑
a∈f−1X (i)
PA|E(a|e)
)1+s
(287)
= EX
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
( ∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)s
(288)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)s
(289)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
PA|E(a|e) +

M
)s
(290)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
PA|E(a|e)s +
( 
M
)s)
(291)
=
( 
M
)s
+
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s (292)
=
s
M s
+ e−sH1+s(A|E|PAE), (293)
where (289), we used the concavity of t 7→ ts for s ∈ [0, 1], in (290) we used the fact that fX is a -almost
universal2 hash function, and in (291) we used the inequality (
∑
i ai)
s ≤∑i asi for s ∈ [0, 1] [13, Problem 4.15(f)].
We remark that the sequence of steps in (287) to (293) is inspired by the work of Hayashi [17] who derived a
similar result but for Shannon-type quantities instead of Re´nyi-type quantities as we do here.
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By (34), we have
C1+s(fX(A)|EX|PAE × PX) = logM −H1+s(fX(A)|EX|PAE × PX). (294)
Uniting (293) and (294) proves (102) as desired.
B. Proof of (103)
Proof: Along exactly the same lines, we also have
e−
s
1+s
H↑1+s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX)
= EX
∑
e
PE(e)
( M∑
i=1
( ∑
a∈f−1X (i)
PA|E(a|e)
)1+s) 11+s
(295)
= EX
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
( ∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)s) 11+s
(296)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)s) 11+s
(297)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
PA|E(a|e) +

M
)s) 11+s
(298)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
PA|E(a|e)s +
( 
M
)s)) 11+s
(299)
=
∑
e
PE(e)
(( 
M
)s
+
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
) 1
1+s
(300)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
(( 
M
) s
1+s
+
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
) 1
1+s
)
(301)
=
( 
M
) s
1+s
+
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
) 1
1+s (302)
=

s
1+s
M
s
1+s
+ e−
s
1+s
H↑1+s(A|E|PAE). (303)
Combining this with the relation between H↑1+s and C
↑
1+s in (36), we obtain (103).
C. Proof of (104)
Proof: For any a, we have
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
≤ PA|E(a|e) +

M
∑
a′ 6=a
PA|E(a′|e) (304)
≤ PA|E(a|e) +

M
(305)
≤ 2 max
{
PA|E(a|e),

M
}
. (306)
First we observe that when PA|E(a|e) ≤ cM , we have
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e) ≤ PA|E(a|e) +

M
≤ c+ 
M
. (307)
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Now we have
e−sC1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX)
=
1
M s
esH1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX) (308)
≥ 1
M s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s
(309)
≥
∑
a,e
PAE(a, e)
(
2 max{MPA|E(a|e), }
)−s (310)
≥ 2−s
∑
a,e
PAE(a, e) min{PA|E(a|e)−sM−s, −s} (311)
= 2−s
∑
a,e:PA|E(a|e)≥M−1
PAE(a, e)PA|E(a|e)−sM−s
+ 2−s
∑
a,e:PA|E(a|e)<M−1
PAE(a, e)
−s, (312)
where in (309) we used the convexity of x 7→ x−s where s ∈ [0, 1] and x ≥ 0 and in (310), we used (306), Thus,
we obtain (104).
D. Proof of (105)
Proof: Using (306) and the convexity of a 7→ a 11−s we have
e
s
1−sH
↑
1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX)
= EX
∑
e
PE(e)
( M∑
i=1
( ∑
a∈f−1X (i)
PA|E(a|e)
)1−s) 11−s
(313)
= EX
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
( ∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s) 11−s
(314)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s) 11−s
(315)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
PA|E(a|e) +

M
)−s) 11−s
(316)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
2 max
{
PA|E(a|e),

M
})−s) 11−s
(317)
= 2−
s
1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e) min
{
PA|E(a|e)−s,
−s
M−s
}) 1
1−s
(318)
= 2−
s
1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ M
PA|E(a|e)1−s +
−s
M−s
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)< M
PA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
(319)
≥ 2− s1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
(( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ M
PA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
+
( −s
M−s
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)< M
PA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s
)
(320)
≥ 2− s1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
(( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ M
PA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s
+
( −s
M−s
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)< M
PA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
)
(321)
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= 2−
s
1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ M
PA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s
+ 2−
s
1−s
M
s
1−s

s
1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)< M
PA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
. (322)
Thus we obtain (105).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
A. Proof of (106)
Proof: Since (1 + x)
1
1+s ≤ 1 + 11+sx, and x 7→ x
1
1+s is concave for s ∈ [0, 1], we have
M
s
1+s e−
s
1+s
H↑1+s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX)
= M
s
1+sEX
∑
e
PE(e)
( M∑
i=1
( ∑
a∈f−1X (i)
PA|E(a|e)
)1+s) 11+s
(323)
= M
s
1+sEX
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
( ∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)s) 11+s
(324)
≤M s1+s
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)s) 11+s
(325)
≤M s1+s
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
PA|E(a|e) +
1
M
)s) 11+s
(326)
≤M s1+s
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
PA|E(a|e)s +
1
M s
)) 1
1+s
(327)
= M
s
1+s
∑
e
PE(e)
(
1
M s
+
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
) 1
1+s
(328)
=
∑
e
PE(e)
(
1 +M s
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
) 1
1+s
(329)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
(
1 +
1
1 + s
M s
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s
)
(330)
= 1 +
1
1 + s
M s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1+s (331)
= 1 +
1
1 + s
M se−sH1+s(A|E|PAE). (332)
Using (294), we obtain (106).
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
A. Proof of (107)
Proof: Using (307), we have
e−sC1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX)
=
1
M s
esH1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX) (333)
=
1
M s
EX
∑
e
PE(e)
M∑
i=1
( ∑
a∈f−1X (i)
PA|E(a|e)
)1−s
(334)
=
1
M s
EX
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
( ∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s
(335)
≥ 1
M s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s
(336)
≥ 1
M s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≤ cM
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s
(337)
≥ 1
M s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≤ cM
PA|E(a|e)
(c+ 
M
)−s
(338)
= PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≤
c
M
}( 1
c+ 
)s
. (339)
We obtain (107) as desired.
B. Proof of (108)
Proof: Using (307), we have
e
s
1−sH
↑
1−s(fX(A)|EX|PAE×PX)
= EX
∑
e
PE(e)
( M∑
i=1
( ∑
a∈f−1X (i)
PA|E(a|e)
)1−s) 11−s
(340)
= EX
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
( ∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s) 11−s
(341)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s) 11−s
(342)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≤ cM
PA|E(a|e)
(
EX
∑
a′∈f−1X (fX(a))
PA|E(a′|e)
)−s) 11−s
(343)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≤ cM
PA|E(a|e)
(c+ 
M
)−s) 11−s
(344)
=
(c+ 
M
)− s
1−s ∑
e
PE(e)
( ∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≤ cM
PA|E(a|e)
) 1
1−s
. (345)
By combining with (36), we obtain (108).
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
A. Proof of (109)
Proof: Define the functions
g1(x, y) := x+ y − 2x1−sys (346)
g2(x, y) := x− 2x1−sys. (347)
Then, we can show that
min
y
g1(x, y) = x(1− 2
1
1−s s
1
1−s−1(1− s)), (348)
which is attained when y = x(2s)
1
1−s . We also define
he,1(m) :=
∑
a∈f−1(m):PA|E(a|e)< cM
PA|E(a|e) (349)
he,2(m) :=
∑
a∈f−1(m):PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e). (350)
Hence,
Pf(A)|E(m|e)1−s = (he,1(m) + he,2(m))1−s ≤ he,1(m)1−s + he,2(m)1−s, (351)
which implies from the definitions of g1 and g2 that
g1
(
Pf(A)|E(m|e),
1
M
)
≥ g2
(
he,2(m),
1
M
)
+ g1
(
he,1(m),
1
M
)
. (352)
Also, we have
he,2(m)
1−s ≤
∑
a∈f−1(m)
PA|E(a|e)1−s. (353)
Thus,
1− 2e−sC1−s(f(A)|E|PAE)
=
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
m
g1
(
Pf(A)|E(m|e),
1
M
)
(354)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
m
g2
(
he,2(m),
1
M
)
+
∑
m
g1
(
he,1(m),
1
M
))
(355)
≥
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
m
(he,2(m)− 2he,2(m)1−sM s) +
∑
m
he,1(m)(1− 2
1
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s))
)
(356)
= 1− 2c−s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
m
he,2(m)
1−sM s − 2 11−s s s1−s (1− s)
∑
m
he,1(m) (357)
≥ 1− 2c−s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM s − 2
1
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)< cM
PA|E(a|e) (358)
= 1− 2c−s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM s
− 2 · 2 s1−s s s1−s (1− s)PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}
, (359)
where (355), (356), and (358) follow from (352), (348), and (353) respectively. Hence, we obtain (109).
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B. Proof of (110)
We first state a useful and easy lemma:
Lemma 7. Let x, y ≥ 0 and t ≥ 1. Then we have
(x+ y)t ≤ 2t−1(xt + yt). (360)
Proof: It is clear that a 7→ at is convex for a ≥ 0. Thus,
(x+ y)t = 2t
(x
2
+
y
2
)t ≤ 2t(xt
2
+
yt
2
)
= 2t−1(xt + yt), (361)
which proves the claim.
Proof of (110): Using the previously proved bound in (109) with |E| = 1, we obtain
e−sC
↑
1−s(f(A)|PA|E=e) ≤ c−s
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM−s
+ 2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≤
c
M
}
. (362)
Taking average over PE and using the bound in (362), we have
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A)|E|PAE)
=
∑
e
PE(e)
(
e−sC
↑
1−s(f(A)|PA|E=e)
) 1
1−s (363)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
[
c−s
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM−s
+ 2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≤
c
M
}] 1
1−s
(364)
≤ 2 s1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
[(
c−s
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM−s
) 1
1−s
+
(
2
s
1−s s
s
1−s (1− s)PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≤
c
M
}) 1
1−s
]
(365)
where in the last step, we applied Lemma 7 with t = 11−s ≥ 1 to the term in parentheses in (364). Thus we
obtain (110).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The inequalities in Lemma 5 can be shown by the information processing inequality for Re´nyi divergence in (11).
A. Proofs of (111) and (112)
Proof: For every e ∈ E , define the function fe : A →M to be
fe := arg min
f
D1−s(Pf(A)|E=e‖Pmix,M). (366)
We start with a claim that will be proved at the end of this subsection.
Lemma 8. For every a such that PA|E=e(a) ≥ 1M , we have |f−1e (fe(a))| = 1.
Now, we partition the set M into two subsets as follows: M1 := fe({a : PA|E=e(a) ≥ cM }) and M2 := Mc1.
See Fig. 9. Next, we define the map g :M→M1 ∪ {0} as
g(i) :=
{
i if i ∈M1
0 if i ∈M2 . (367)
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{a : PA(a) ≥ cM } {a : PA(a) < cM }
a ∈ A
i ∈M1 ∪M2
i ∈M1 ∪ {0}
f
g
M1
0
M1
M2
Fig. 9. Illustration of the steps in (368) to (372) where the dependences on e ∈ E are suppressed.
Note that the map g depends on e ∈ E (through M1 and M2) but we suppress this dependence for brevity.
Let Pfe(A)|E=e ◦ g−1 be the “output distribution” taking values on M1 ∪ {0} induced by the “input distribu-
tion” Pfe(A)|E=e and the “deterministic channel” g, i.e., for every i ∈ M1 ∪ {0}, (Pfe(A)|E=e ◦ g−1)(i) :=
Pfe(A)|E=e(g
−1(i)) =
∑
j∈M:g(i)=j Pfe(A)|E=e(j). We also use the notation Pmix,M ◦ g−1 analogously. Due to
the information processing inequality for the Re´nyi divergence in (11), we obtain
e−sD1−s(Pfe(A)|E=e‖Pmix,M)
≤ e−sD1−s(Pfe(A)|E=e◦g−1‖Pmix,M◦g−1) (368)
=
∑
i∈{0}∪M1
(
(Pfe(A)|E=e ◦ g−1)(i)
)1−s(
(Pmix,M ◦ g−1)(i)
)s (369)
=
(
(Pfe(A)|E=e ◦ g−1)(0)
)1−s(
(Pmix,M ◦ g−1)(0)
)s
+
∑
i∈M1
(
(Pfe(A)|E=e ◦ g−1)(i)
)1−s( 1
M
)s
(370)
≤ PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s
+
∑
i∈M1
(
(Pfe(A)|E=e ◦ g−1)(i)
)1−s( 1
M
)s
(371)
= PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s
+
∑
a:PA|E=e(a)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM−s, (372)
where in (369) we used the definition of D1−s, in (370) we split the resulting sum into {0} and M1, in (371) we
upper bounded (Pmix,M ◦ g−1)(0) by 1 and we noted that all the symbols i ∈ M2 = fe({a : PA|E=e(a) < cM })
are merged into the symbol 0 under g and finally in (372), we used the fact that g and fe are one-to-one restricted
to M1 and {a : PA|E=e(a) ≥ cM } respectively (Lemma 8 and the fact that c ≥ 1). See Fig. 9 for an illustration of
these steps. Taking the average of (372) over PE(e), we obtain (111).
Furthermore, we have ∑
a:PA|E=e(a)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM−s
≤
∑
a:PA|E=e(a)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)
( c
M
)−s
M−s (373)
= PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E=e(a) ≥
c
M
}
c−s. (374)
Substituting (374) into the second term in (372) and then taking the average over PE(e), we obtain (112).
It remains to prove Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 8: It suffices to consider the case |E| = 1. Dropping the dependences on e, we denote fe as
f and PA|E=e as PA in the sequel.
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We proceed by contradiction. The essential idea is that an optimal f (given by (366)) must induce a distribution
Pf(A) on M that is “as close to uniform as possible” since we are minimizing D1−s(Pf(A)‖Pmix,M).
Formally, assume, to the contrary, that |f−1(f(a1))| ≥ 2 for some a1 ∈ A with PA(a1) ≥ 1M . Because
|f−1(f(a1))| ≥ 2, there exists a2 6= a1 such that f(a1) = f(a2) = j for some j ∈ M. Because PA(a2) > 0, we
have
∑
a∈f−1(j) PA(a) >
1
M . This in turn implies that there exists i ∈M such that
∑
a∈f−1(i) PA(a) <
1
M . Recall
that f was designed to minimize
D1−s(Pf(A)‖Pmix,M) = −
1
s
log
∑
i∈M
( ∑
a∈f−1(i)
PA(a)
)1−s( 1
M
)s
, (375)
or equivalently, to maximize
∑
i
(∑
a∈f−1(i) PA(a)
)1−s. Now we create a new hash function
f˜(a) :=
{
f(a) a 6= a2
i a = a2
. (376)
Let u, v, u′, v′ be any four non-negative numbers such that u + v = u′ + v′ = t and p = u/t, p′ = u′/t and
|p − 1/2| < |p′ − 1/2|. This means that (p, 1 − p) is closer to the uniform Bernoulli distribution compared to
(p′, 1− p′). Then it is easy to check that
(u′)1−s + (v′)1−s < u1−s + v1−s. (377)
Now denoting 1M +δ1 :=
∑
a∈f−1(j) PA(a),
1
M −δ2 :=
∑
a∈f−1(i) PA(a) for positive numbers δ1 and δ2 (positive by
the above construction of the sets f−1(i) and f−1(j)), and letting q := PA(a2) ≤ δ1, t := ( 1M +δ1)+( 1M −δ2), we
find that 1t (
1
M + δ1− q, 1M − δ2 + q) is closer to the uniform Bernoulli distribution compared to 1t ( 1M + δ1, 1M − δ2).
Using inequality (377), we find that( ∑
a∈f−1(j)
PA(a)
)1−s
+
( ∑
a∈f−1(i)
PA(a)
)1−s
<
( ∑
a∈f−1(j)\{a2}
PA(a)
)1−s
+
(( ∑
a∈f−1(i)
PA(a)
)
+ PA(a2)
)1−s
. (378)
Since f−1(k) = f˜−1(k) for all k /∈ {i, j}, (378) implies that∑
i
( ∑
a∈f−1(i)
PA(a)
)1−s
<
∑
i
( ∑
a∈f˜−1(i)
PA(a)
)1−s
, (379)
contradicting the optimality of f .
B. Proof of (113)
Proof: Here, we employ the following expression for C↑1−s(A|E|PAE):
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(A|E|PAE) =
1
|A| s1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
(∑
a
PA|E(a|e)1−s
) 1
1−s
. (380)
To minimize e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A)|E|PAE), it is enough to minimize
∑
i∈M(
∑
a∈f−1(i) PA|E=e(a))
1−s for each e.
Fortunately, the discussion in the proof in Appendix E-A (and, in particular, the bound (111)) shows that this
value is upper bounded by ∑
a:PA|E=e(a)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−s + PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s
M s. (381)
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Thus,
e−
s
1−sC
↑
1−s(f(A)|E|PAE) (382)
≤ 1
M
s
1−s
∑
e
PE(e)
(
PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E=e(a) ≥
c
M
}
c−sM s
+ PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s
M s
) 1
1−s
(383)
=
∑
e
PE(e)
(
PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E=e(a) ≥
c
M
}
c−s
+ PA|E=e
{
a : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}1−s) 11−s
. (384)
Hence, we obtain (113) as desired.
C. Proofs of (114) and (115)
Proof: The proofs of these bounds are similar to those of (111) and (112) in Appendix E-A and thus are
omitted.
D. Proof of (116)
Proof: The proof of this bound is similar to that of (113) in Appendix E-B and is thus omitted.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
A. Proof of (117)
Proof: The proof of this bound is similar to the proof of (109) which is presented in Appendix D-A. We
provide the details here.
When PA|E(a|e) < cM , we have PA|E(a|e)1−sM s ≤ PA|E(a|e)c−s. Thus, starting from (359), we have
1− 2e−sC1−s(f(A)|E|PAE)
≥ 1− 2c−s
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
a:PA|E(a|e)≥ cM
PA|E(a|e)1−sM s
− 2 · 2 s1−s s s1−s (1− s)PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}
(385)
≥ 1− 2c−sPAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) ≥
c
M
}
− 2c · 2 s1−s s s1−s (1− s)PAE
{
(a, e) : PA|E(a|e) <
c
M
}
. (386)
This completes the proof of (117).
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